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1. INTRODUCTION
During the past quarter-century, the growing judicial infatuation with
summary judgment has been justly criticized.' Criticism began almost
immediately after the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy2 and continued as a
more expansive approach to summary judgment was applied by lower
federal courts and increasingly by state courts influenced by federal
developments. 3 It spiked in the recent years as a near-unanimous Court
1. "Infatuation," although perhaps not a particularly scholarly or diplomatic word, captures
well what happens when courts take an excessively positive view of particular persons. entities.
procedures, institutions, theories. or outcomes such that courts are excessively driven to rule in
their favor notwithstanding tension or even outright conflict with rules, norms, and history that
supposedly guides courts. A classic example of this is the U.S. Supreme Court's excessively
uncritical embrace of arbitration. See Jeffrey W. Stempel. Tainted Love: Arbitral Infatuation in
Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012)
(showing how the Court's policy preference for arbitration prompts it to compel arbitration in
situations where text. legislative history. and purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act argue to the
contrary); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1996) (illustrating how
the Court's unrealistically sanguine view of the efficacy of arbitration prompts it to overlook
concerns regarding the quality of consent to such clauses).
2. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts about Summary
Judgment. 100 YALE L.J. 73, 118 (1990) (showing that a move toward substantial evidence
standard and greater judicial authority to grant summary judgment is likely to result in more
errors than estimated by the Court); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-
Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment.
54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 35-36 (1988) (showing that the 1986 trilogy reflects a shift to a doctrine
more favorable to defendants not supported by a fair reading of Rule 56); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Value of Adjudication, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99 (1988) (noting that in the 1986
trilogy, the Court unwisely authorized expanded factfinding authority for judges). The trilogy
refers to three summary judgment cases decided by the Court in 1986: Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). These cases all endorsed a broader
and more frequent use of summary judgment and refined summary judgment doctrine in ways
facilitating its greater use. See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE,
PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 476 99 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the background of the summary
judgment motion and the refinement of doctrine brought about by the trilogy); Steven Alan
Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D.
183, 184 (1987) (discussing how the 1986 trilogy reflected significant doctrinal change making
summary judgment more available): see also JOSEPH GLANNON ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
COURSEBOOK 988-1013 (2011) (presenting the trilogy as controlling law with almost no
historical background).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases. 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 541-45 (2010) (noting and criticizing expanded summary judgment, particularly its impact
on civil rights and job discrimination cases that are disfavored by some judges); Elizabeth
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 707-11 (2007) [hereinafter Schneider, Dangers] (discussing the trend
towards summary judgment and the consequences of this trend): Theresa M. Beiner. Let the Jury
Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75
S.C. L. REV. 791, 820 (2002) (noting and criticizing the increased use of summary judgment to
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issued perhaps its most problematic summary decision in Scott v.
HarriS4 and rewrote the rules of pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal5 in a manner that arguably turned Rule
12(b)(6) motions into bad applications of summary judgment.6
dispose of sexual harassment suits): Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the
"Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982. 1048 (2003) (noting and criticizing the
increased use of summary judgment and other pretrial disposition devices as an unwise
contraction to the number of trials and public rights to trial and jury access); see also Brooke D.
Coleman, The Celotex Initial Burden Standard and An Opportunity to "Revivify" Rule 56, 32 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 295. 306-08 (2007) (suggesting that the initial burden required of summary judgment
movants be clarified); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REV. 139, 144 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional]
(suggesting summary judgment unconstitutionally violates the right to trial by jury). But see
Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625, 1627 (2008)
(discussing how summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment). Others have
argued that the summary judgment device should be abolished on prudential trial efficiency
grounds. See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 545
(2007) (suggesting that the aggressive invocation of summary judgment leads to greater
adjudicative error, higher litigation costs, and waste of judicial resources) D. Theodore Rave.
Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 890 (2006)
(discussing how summary judgment is not necessarily faster or cheaper than trial in many
instances). But see Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
689, 692, 694 (2012) [hereinafter Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment] (discussing how
summary judgment promotes overall judicial efficiency in an acceptably fair way by focusing
attention on facts prior to trial and creating a "settlement premium" for colorable claims that
survive summary judgment); Linda S. Mullenix, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Summary
Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado About Very Little. 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 561. 583-84 (2012)
(suggesting a minimal impact of the trilogy on frequency and outcome of summary judgment
motions); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy. 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 133-35 (2006)
(arguing that the Celotex regime is not unfair to disfavored litigants).
4. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
5. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-54 (2009) (relying on "judicial experience and
common sense," a 5-4 Court majority concluded that allegations of the Attorney General's
knowledge and approval of illegal detention were insufficiently "plausible" under Twombly); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (dismissing an antitrust complaint after finding
direct allegations of conspiracy inadequate to make the claim sufficiently "plausible"). Scholars
have generally been highly critical of these decisions. See, e.g.. Steven B. Burbank & Stephen N.
Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 399, 403-08 (2011) (criticizing Twombly & Iqbal); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 60 DUKE L.J. 1. 40-
41 (2010) (arguing that the effective imposition of heightened pleading standards in Twombly and
Iqbal are inconsistent with the text and intent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); A.
Benjamin Spencer. Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 185, 200 (2010) (criticizing Twombly and Iqbal as unwisely contracting access to
adjudication): A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausible Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431. 444 (2008)
(examining and criticizing Twombly, offering thoughts on what pleading allegations may be
deemed sufficiently plausible to withstand dismissal motions); Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of
Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 774 (2009) (finding pretrial disposition by courts
inconsistent with the jury trial right and value of illuminating disputes through discovery and
trial); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under
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In the wake of the trilogy, there has also been renewed interest in
studying summary judgment in operation.7 Although the empirical
efforts in this area have been helpful, we still know comparatively little
about summary judgment in daily operation. Regardless of the
shortcomings of available data or professional differences as to its
meaning, this Article posits that we know enough to make an
assessment of whether modern use of summary judgment is too
aggressive.
The academy has attacked aggressive summary judgment use and the
TwomblylIqbalg plausibility standard for assessing pleadings as
1qbal and Twombly. 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15. 17 (2010) (discussing how the
empowerment of trial courts to dismiss claims trial judges view as "implausible" under Twombly
and lqbal effectively converts Rule 12(b)(6) motions to summary judgment motions); see also id.
at 16-17 n.2-3 (listing critical scholarly commentary and articles supportive of Twombly and
Iqbal).
6. See Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing the
similarities and differences of 12(b)(6) and summary judgment motions); Suja A. Thomas, Why
the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1867-68 (2008)
(explaining that because Rule 12(b)(6) motions are in effect summary judgment motions after
Twombly. dismissal motions arguably violate the jury trial right as does judicial fact-finding in
the context of summary judgment); Howard M. Wasserman. Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 169 (2010) (forcing plaintiffs to prove
plausibility to the satisfaction of judges is an unfair burden, particularly for civil rights litigants
who may face skeptical judges tending to defer to governments or employers). But see Richard
A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary
Judgments. 25 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 61. 61-62 (2007) (viewing Twombly as a de facto
summary judgment case and approving aggressive use of Rule 12(b)(6) in such cases where the
evidence was largely in the public domain and could, in the author's view, be assessed by the
Court to determine whether an antitrust claim was sufficiently meritorious to go forward): Adam
N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem. 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1340-41 (2010) (providing a less
critical reading of Twombly and Jqbal and suggesting it will not have the negative impact posited
by critics).
7. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:
Drifting Toward Bethelehem or Gomorrah?, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 591 (2004)
(reviewing empirical data and concluding that there is reasonable basis to determine that
summary judgment increased significantly during the 1960-2000 time period): Linda S.
Mullenix, supra note 3, at 561 n.2 (collecting Federal Judicial Center studies on the matter); see
also, e.g., JOE S. CECIL & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PRACTICE ACROSS DISTRICTS WITH VARIATIONS IN LOCAL RULES 9 (2008)
(highlighting the trial courts' grant of summary judgment in a substantial number of cases); JOE
CECIL & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ESTIMATE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ACTIVITY IN
FISCAL YEAR 2006 (Apr. 2007 as revised June 2007) (noting frequency of summary judgment
motions and grants); Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six
Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 881-82 (2007) (finding substantial
use of summary judgment during the time period since the Court's 1986 trilogy): Patricia M.
Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1914-15 (1998) (noting dominance of
disposition by summary judgment was contrasted with resolution of dispute via trial).
8. Because the Twombly and 1qbal cases were decided within a short time of one another and
work together to heighten pleading requirements. the two cases are also often referred to in legal
literature as "Twiqbal."
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permitting too much decision-making based upon an individual judge's
gut reaction to a complaint. 9  Particularly compelling have been
analyses strongly suggesting that more aggressive summary judgment
use has demonstrated gender bias and hostility toward civil rights suits,
job discrimination claims, and other types of social action litigation.10
Overlooked to date has been a central non-ideological contention of this
Article: summary judgment is simply not being performed very
accurately according to the law's self-professed rules governing use of
the motion and certainly is not being applied with enough accuracy to
warrant expanded use.
Grants of summary judgment are reversed at too high a rate to have
been properly granted. The very premise of summary judgment is that
there are no genuine disputes of material fact, that no reasonable jury
could find for the nonmovant, and that the law is so clear that there is
no valid reason to postpone entry of judgment. By these standards, the
grant of summary judgment (partial or whole) by a federal district judge
9. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 162-70 (criticizing the summary judgment trilogy for
usurping the jury role, illegitimately changing procedural rules without sufficient study and use of
amendment process. and introducing additional waste and bias in adjudication). Twiqbal has
been at least as criticized as the trilogy, perhaps more in view of both the large volume of
negative commentary in the short time since these decisions and Congress's serious (but
unsuccessful) efforts to legislatively overrule the pleading decisions, something that did not take
place in the aftermath of the trilogy. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111 th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2010); Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009);
Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115. 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); 156 Cong. Rec.
S 11, 37 38 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen Spector (Pa.)) (criticizing
Twiqbal); Burbank & Subrin, Litigation and Democracy, supra note 5, at 399-408 (viewing
Twombly and Iqbal as lawless, disastrous decisions); Stephen N. Subrin. Ashcroft v. lqbal:
Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (regarding lqbal as among the worst Supreme Court decisions ever but
raising similar, if less severe. criticisms of Twombly).
10. See Therese M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions or Privileges of
Employment Under Title V11?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643, 650 (1996) (noting the degree to which male-
dominated workplaces may place subtle discriminatory pressures of conformity on women
workers-a type of discrimination that may not be adequately appreciated by male judges
granting summary judgment); Therese M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile
Environment Cases. 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 119 (1999) (showing that because hostile
environment cases depend on the factfinder's assessment of context and circumstantial evidence,
grants of summary judgment in such cases erroneously usurp the power of the jury); Ann C.
McGinley. Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment
in Title VI and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 252 (1993) (discussing frequent court errors
of crediting a discrimination defendant's explanation of adverse employment decisions rather
than allowing a trial and jury determination of truth between conflicting plaintiff and defendant
narratives); Schneider. Changing Shape. supra note 3 (showing how more frequent summary
judgment grants tend to disadvantage discrimination plaintiffs, with judges increasingly usurping
the jury role of drawing inferences from facts of record); Schneider. Dangers of Summary
Judgment. supra note 3 (discussing the trend of granting summary judgment with more frequency
and its troubling consequences).
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(at least on no-genuine-dispute-of-fact grounds) should be affirmed
nearly 100% of the time.' Instead, we find that grants of summary
judgment are reversed between 20% and 40% of the time, depending on
the appellate court, type of case, and time period.12 Reversal rates this
high indicate that summary judgment has failed on its own terms.
Because of its imperfect application, summary judgment is almost
certainly not the timesaving efficiency device posited by Justice
Rehnquist in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.13  More likely is that the
aggressive use of summary judgment costs society more than would a
procedural code with no summary judgment mechanism. 14
Critics claiming race, gender, and class bias in summary judgment
received a substantial shot in the arm with the publication of the
blockbuster article Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
I1. Expecting this kind of accuracy in trial court summary judgment determinations would
seem especially appropriate in light of the trial court's discretion to deny even a well-presented
motion if the judge is of the view that further adjudication will better illuminate the issues of the
case. See Steven S. Gensler, Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment: Can Judges Just Say No? 7
(Mar. 8, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal) [hereinafter Gensler, Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment] (concluding that the
answer is "yes"); see also Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139, 1160
(2010) [hereinafter Gensler, Must, Should, Shall] (making a similar point). More defensible are
trial-appellate differences over grants of summary judgment where the facts are essentially
stipulated but where the appellate court simply construes applicable law differently than the trial
court. Reasonable lawyers may have divergent resolutions of legal questions. See infra text
accompanying notes 110-21 (expounding on the distinction between no-dispute-of-fact summary
judgment motions and divergence-over-applicable-law summary judgment motions).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 96-109 (discussing the less than perfect affirmance rate
of summary judgment decisions and the accompanying inference that trial judges use too much
discretion when deciding these motions); see also FRANK B. CROSS. DECISION MAKING IN THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 48 (2007) (showing how grants of summary judgment were affirmed
approximately three-fourths of the time during the 1950s and 1960s. a rate falling to two-thirds
during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves " Come Out Ahead?
Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870 1970, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 403, 406
(1987) (finding an overall affirmance rate of roughly 60% for most cases, including reviews of
pretrial disposition). See generally ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS
ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 62-63 (2001) (finding similar rates of affirmance overall);
DONALD R. SONGER. REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 105 (2001) (by examining the rates of reversal
between 1925 and 1988, finding that the rate only varied between 26% and 31 % throughout the
sixty-four years).
13. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 317, 327 (1986) (extolling the virtues
of summary judgment in terms so glowing as to suggest it is a panacea for modern litigation
problems); Stempel, supra note 2, at 106 (finding the opinion's praise of summary judgment
virtues naively inflated).
14. See Bronsteen, supra note 3 (finding summary judgment frequently wasteful and
inefficient); Rave, supra note 3, at 890 (explaining that summary judgment increases the costs
borne by litigants): Stempel, supra note 2, at 170-72 (criticizing the Court's cost-benefit analysis
in changing Rule 56 and arguing that it did not take into consideration many associated
disadvantages such as increased litigation expenses and waste of the judiciary's time).
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Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Iliberalism.15 The article was
prompted by the Court's decision in Scott v. Harris,16 which involved a
civil rights suit alleging excessive use of force by police pursuing a
fleeing suspect in a high speed car chase. The chase had been
videotaped by pursuing police. Reviewing the taped chase, the Court by
an 8-1 vote decreed that the only reasonable assessment of the situation
was that fleeing speeder Harris was a sufficient danger to the public
such that policeman Scott's ramming of the fleeing vehicle to get it off
the road (a maneuver resulting in serious injuries to Harris) was justified
and precluded a civil rights claim sounding in excessive use of force. 17
The authors of Whose Eyes, Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and
Braman, showed the videotaped automobile chase at issue in Scott v.
Harris to a large sample of viewers. Even though the Court (as
discussed at greater length below) had been nearly unanimous in
holding that no reasonable jury could find unconstitutional use of force
by the police in halting the chase by bumping the fleeing suspect off the
road, the Kahan et al. sample of prospective jurors differed widely in
their perceptions of the chase scene. Although a majority agreed with
the Court, a substantial minority disagreed. Further, those disagreeing
were disproportionately from minority groups.' 8
Even prior to publication of the Kahan et al. study, scholars had been
critical of Scott v. Harris as violating the traditional norms of summary
judgment-even under the pro-summary judgment ethos of the
trilogy-in that it involved the Justices making an assessment of facts in
the manner of a jury.19 In dissent, Justice Stevens gently mocked the
15. See Dan M. Kahan, David A Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism. 122 HARv. L. REv. 837. 879
(2009) (showing how a group of laypersons viewing the videotape described as clear by the
Supreme Court exhibited a range of interpretations. suggesting that the Court erred in thinking the
videotape could be interpreted in only one way).
16. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
17. Id. at 385-86.
18. See Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 864-80 (presenting the results of their study); infra text
accompanying notes 68-69 (describing the study in more detail).
19. See, e.g.. George M. Dery 111. The Needless "Slosh" Through the "Morass of
Reasonableness": The Supreme Court's Usurpation of Fact Finding Powers in Assessing
Reasonable Force in Scott v. Harris. 18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 417, 436-48 (2008)
(criticizing Justice Scalia's reliance on the Matsushita case in Scott v. Harris); David Kessler.
Comment, Justices in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 31
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423. 427-35 (2008) (cautioning against judges usurping the power of
the jury when deciding summary judgment motions based on video evidence that causes the
judges to become overconfident in their decisions); Martin A. Schwartz, Analysis of Videotape
Evidence in Police Misconduct Cases, 25 TOURO L. REv. 857, 860-63 (2009) (criticizing Scott v.
Harris); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REv. 600, 607-10 (2009) (criticizing the growing trend of judges
2012] 633
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majority as "my colleagues on the jury" in response to the majority's
willingness to so quickly take over the fact-finding function and to draw
inferences traditionally left to the jury.20 The Kahan et al. study was a
particularly strong blow to Scott v. Harris and its defenders, both
because it empirically demonstrated that prospective jurors could
disagree in a way that the majority refused to acknowledge and because
the divergence of the venire was correlated with demographic and
cultural differences as well as ideological differences.21
Building on Professor Kahan's earlier scholarship and coinage of the
term,22 the authors of the experiment and article referred to the Scott v.
Harris majority's inability to accept the possibility of different
perceptions as "Cognitive Illiberalism," which they characterized as
"failure to recognize the connection between perceptions of societal risk
and contested visions of the ideal society." 23 The term has already
become part of the legal lexicon, at least among scholars. 24 Clearly, it
captures an important anxiety not only about the degree of perception
divergence within society but also about the work of judges, whose
performance can seem often wrong but never in doubt. Of particular
concern is the prospect that false judicial certainty is culturally bound
and that judges are particularly bad at envisioning the possibility of a
different assessment by persons with different backgrounds and
beliefs.25
deciding summary judgment based on their "brute sense impressions" of video evidence); see
also Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure. supra note 5. at 762-77 (criticizing the Scott
v. Harris analysis and outcome as well as the trilogy on these grounds; citing to the Kahan et al.
study); Amelia G. Yowell, Note, Race to Judgment? An Empirical Study of Scott v. Harris and
Summary Judgment, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1759. 1777 (2010) (suggesting that Scott v. Harris
has not greatly altered summary judgment practice but noting that where courts cite Scott v.
Harris they are more likely to grant summary judgment).
20. Scott. 550 U.S. at 389. 392 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
21. See Kahan et al.. supra note 15, at 864-80 (describing results of the study); Thomas, The
Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, supra note 5, at 762 65 (referring to the Kahan et al. study as
strong evidence that the Scott v. Harris decision was incorrect).
22. Dan M. Kahan. The Cognitively Illiberal State. 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 125 (2007); see
also Dan M. Kahan, The Economics-Conventional, Behavioral, and Political of "Subsequent
Remedial Measures" Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1616, 1651 (2010) (illustrating the
discrepancy between cognitive bias that results from watching a film and the judicial system's
requirement that the film as evidence be given dispositive significance); Dan M. Kahan, The
Supreme Court 2010 Term-Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1. 24 (2011) (deploying the cognitive
illiberalism concept and related field of cultural cognition in assessing legal policy).
23. See Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 838 (from the abstract of the article) (emphasis
omitted).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 72-94 (describing the cognitive illiberalism concept
and cultural cognition movement in greater detail).
25. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification
634 [Vol. 43
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"Cognitive Illiberalism," as used in this Article, refers also to
concepts such as false certainty bias and false consensus bias.26
Although the cognitive illiberalism label and concept are important, it
may rest too heavily on race, gender, and ethnic differences 27 or may be
problematic because of years of imprecise political rhetoric.28
Consequently, this Article will take some license and use the term
cognitive illiberalism more broadly than its originators to mean more
than just blindness to the differing views of those in different
demographic groups. Although the term has become so widespread and
wonderfully evocative that its use is unavoidable, it does not, as strictly
defined by its originators, capture the problem of divergent perception
throughout society and the consequent imperative to use greater caution
in granting summary judgment.
The concept of cognitive illiberalism should include not only
blindness to the differing views of those who are "different" but also
blindness to the degree to which similarly situated persons belonging to
the same demographics can reasonably disagree about what a video
shows: whether a manager was prejudiced in firing a worker, whether a
driver was negligent, whether a speaker knew his statements were
untrue, etc. Perhaps better nomenclature might be apt, but because of
the prominence of the term and the connotative meaning it conveys, it is
used, however loosely, throughout this Article.
and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to
Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REv. LITIG. 733, 740-53 (collecting
sources that note the degree to which judges, like all persons, wear figurative perceptual blinders).
26. See, e.g.. Lawrence Solan et al.. False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation. 108
COLUM. L. REv. 1268. 1269 (2008) (discussing how, in response to an experiment, individual
readers of contract language are quite certain that they know what the language means and that
others agree with them even though readers as a whole may actually assign substantially different
meanings to the same language).
27. I realize of course that Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman might respond that by
stripping out or de-emphasizing the cultural demographics of the cognitive illiberalism concept I
am missing the point. I prefer to think of my assessment as attempting to expand the concept and
to make clear that the types of differences noted in their study also are apparent within seemingly
homogenous demographic groups. See infra text accompanying note 142 (discussing the degree
to which even in groups largely supportive of the Scott v. Harris ruling, there were significant
numbers disagreeing with the majority of their demographic group).
28. The word "liberal" and its variants in the United States has come to largely connote left-
leaning progressive political views while "liberalism" as the term is used by Professor Kahan
means the more traditional use of liberal as open, tolerant, non-doctrinaire and willing to consider
a variety of information and perspectives (e.g., the liberal arts in education). See MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 670 (10th ed. 1996) (presenting various definitions of
"liberal" along these lines as well as the common connotation of progressive or left-leaning
political views).
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People, including judges, are not only too often blind to the
possibility of disagreement by those who are different but also blind to
the likelihood that even many similar persons will see things
differently. 29  Consequently, judges should be reluctant to grant
summary judgment unless there is essentially no serious prospect that
others will disagree as to whether the facts are at issue and what the
facts show. In the absence of such certainty, denial of summary
judgment serves both logistical efficiency and adjudication accuracy.30
In the absence of this higher level of certainty, grants of summary
judgment as a whole waste legal resources, delay dispute resolution, and
create the prospect of the injustices frequently noted by the critics of
summary judgment.
This Article begins with a review of Scott v. Harris and the problems
reflected by the Court's excessive focus on a portion of the evidence
and cocksure confidence that there was only one reasonable view of the
record.31  It continues with a telling anecdote about first-year law
students' reaction to the video that precludes any effective defense of
the Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment. First-year law
students-a group much more homogenous than the viewers of the
videotape in the Kahan et al. study-diverged substantially regarding
the conclusions that could be drawn from the videotape, 32 a reaction
that should have been impossible had the Scott v. Harris majority been
correct.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94, 135-38 (noting the degree of divergence in
perception even within relatively homogenous groups).
30. As discussed below, I am constrained to dispute Professor Brunet's optimistic view that
summary judgment makes litigation more efficient. See Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of
Summary Judgment, supra note 3, at 699 (discussing how summary judgment motions serve a
valuable signaling process that aids settlement). Greater judicial embrace of Professor Gensler's
argument that trial judges possess ample discretion to deny summary judgment would, at least at
the margin, help alleviate the criticisms made of post-trilogy summary judgment. See Gensler,
Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment, supra note 11, at 44 (noting that judges may refuse to
grant summary judgment for prudential reasons even if the movant has technically met the criteria
for grant of motion); Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, supra note II, at 1160 (explaining how the
amendment of Rule 56 will give judges discretion to deny summary judgment even if the moving
party has met all the requirements of the rule). Similarly. the safeguards noted by Professor
Brunet, if more vigorously deployed, would improve summary judgment practice. See Edward
Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1165, 1177 (2010). This Article
argues for a more fundamental shift in attitude as well, one that will prompt judges to be cautious
in concluding that their perceptions represent the only "reasonable" assessment of the record and
contending inferences proffered by parties.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 36-69 (discussing in detail the facts of Scott v. Harris).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71 (explaining how the group split into three
diverging views).
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This Article then expounds upon the concept of cognitive illiberalism
and argues that the problem is much bigger than "mere" difference in
perception of risk, discordant visions of the good society, cultural bias,
or cultural boundedness and extends to perceptions of all sorts, not
solely those involving risk.33 It next examines the fate of summary
judgment grants on appeal, highlighting the degree to which summary
judgment, despite being designed for use in "slam dunk" situations, is
improperly granted in an inordinate portion of cases-at least when the
basis for summary judgment was the supposed absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact.
This Article then discusses possible solutions to the problem of
overuse of summary judgment and concludes that the most effective
response is a large dose of judicial humility or consciousness-raising.
Among the overlooked virtues of the trial process is the potential for its
controlled presentation, adversarial testing, and forced deliberation to
mitigate cultural illiberalism and its perceptual cousins.34 Some greater
restraint in granting summary judgment would more often allow these
benefits of trial as well as avoiding the economic waste created by
problematic grants of summary judgment.
The problems of application of post-trilogy summary judgment
suggest one concrete act of judicial humility that would greatly improve
practice: return to the pre-trilogy view that summary judgment should
be denied even if the non-movant's supporting evidence is "thin" or
scintilla-like, a standard likely to minimize judicial weighing of
contested evidence. This more forgiving attitude toward what
constitutes a genuine clash of proof could also be faithfully applied to
the range of permissible inferences drawn from the evidence.35
II. ScoTT r. HARRIS: THE CULMINATION OF THE TRILOGY'S WRONG TURN
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As noted above, in Scott v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the assessment of three lower court judges and compelled summary
judgment by determining that their interpretation of a single piece of
evidence was the only reasonable assessment of the evidence.36 The
33. See infra text accompanying notes 72-94 (discussing Professor Kahan's contribution to
cognitive illiberalism and other cognitive constraints that affect perceptions of evidence).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 95-175 (addressing the deficiencies that cognitive
illiberalism causes when judges rule on motions for summary judgment).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 175-210 (discussing the inefficiencies the trilogy
created and suggesting a return to the pre-trilogy summary judgment standard in which summary
judgment was similar to directed verdicts).
36. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 80 (2007).
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genesis of the case was a speeding motorist, Victor Harris, who refused
to stop when Atlanta area police attempted to pull him over a little
before 11:00 p.m. on March 29, 2001. Harris took off and the police
began a high-speed chase, exceeding 85 m.p.h. at times.37 Harris had
no criminal record and the vehicle contained no contraband. His foolish
decision to flee resulted because "he was scared, wanted to get home,
and was hoping to avoid an impound fee for his car." 38
Coweta County Sherriff's Deputy Timothy Scott joined the chase, 39
colliding with the Harris vehicle in a shopping center parking lot Harris
had entered before escaping again on to the open road.40 Harris had
been clocked going 73 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone 41 but had not been
observed driving while impaired or committing any other crime. 42 All
of this was unknown to Scott, who decided that the situation justified
action to halt Harris's attempted escape. 43 After six minutes and nine
miles of chasing, Harris finally was forced to a halt when Scott struck
Harris's rear bumper, knowingly putting Harris at a significant risk of
serious injury or death, and ultimately causing Harris to suffer a broken
neck, resulting in him becoming a quadriplegic. 44
37. The basic facts of the car chase and collision are recounted in Scott. 550 U.S. at 374-76.
as well as in the trial and appellate court opinions, which differed markedly from the Court's
discussion of the facts and application of summary judgment. See Harris v. Coweta Cnty., No.
CIVA 3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), aff d, 433 F.3d 807
(11th Cir. 2005).
38. See Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527, at *I. The Supreme Court opinion makes no
mention of Harris's asserted reason for flight and generally tends to omit or abbreviate parts of
the record favoring the plaintiffs case. The lower court opinions and the Stevens dissent present
a version of the facts much more favorable to Harris.
39. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375; Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 810 (affirming the Northern District of
Georgia trial court's ruling denying summary judgment to Scott but reversing the trial court's
denial of summary judgment to the Coweta County Sheriff). Both the Eleventh Circuit and
district court opinions give more detail about the parking lot collision, which may have involved
Harris ramming Scott's car. Although this seems a possible motivation for Scott to have been
excessively aggressive in his pursuit of Harris's vehicle, this is not fully developed by the lower
courts and is largely ignored by the Supreme Court.
40. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375; Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 810; Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527,
at *1-*2.
41. Scott. 550 U.S. at 374: Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 810; Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527.
at *I.
42. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375; Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 810; Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527,
at *1-*2.
43. Scott. 550 U.S. at 375: Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 810; Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527.
at * 1-*2. In contradiction to the reported opinions, Scott has stated that he did know Harris was
wanted for speeding and not a more serious crime. See infra note 61 (noting that the Court did
not even take into consideration Scott's lack of knowledge). If this is correct, Scott's decision to
bump Harris's vehicle is harder to justify.
44. Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 843-44.
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Harris brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Scott, the Sheriffs
Department, and the County, alleging violation of his civil rights
through excessive use of force by the police. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court.45 On appeal,
an Eleventh Circuit panel unanimously affirmed denial of summary
judgment as to Scott but overturned the district court's refusal to give
summary judgment to the Sheriff on the ground that the undisputed
facts failed to establish a defective Department policy regarding high
speed chases, a prerequisite for the Sheriff Department's liability
because the Sheriff was not personally involved in the chase and § 1983
does not permit liability for constitutional torts on the basis of
respondeat superior.46
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether
Scott was entitled to qualified immunity, which would be available to a
police officer who did not violate "clearly established" law at the time
of the interception incident. 47 Also subject to review was whether Scott
had used deadly force in violation of the test set forth in Tennessee v.
Garner.48  In Garner, the Court found police to violate the victim's
constitutional rights by shooting unless there was probable cause to
believe that the suspect posed a sufficiently serious threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or to the public. 49  The Eleventh
Circuit's opinion had largely applied the Garner standard to high speed
chase situations.50 The Supreme Court, although not doing much to
clarify the legal standard applicable to such cases, 51 resolved Scott v.
Harris by commanding entry of summary judgment in favor of Scott
45. Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527.
46. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 816-20.
47. This has been the law of official immunity since Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982). as re-emphasized and refined in Mitchell v. Forsyth. 472 U.S. 511 (1985) and further
developed in cases such as Saucier v. Katz. 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001) and Hope v. Pelzer, 536
U.S. 730 (2002). See MARK R. BROWN & KIT KINPORTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION UNDER
SECTION 1983 109-12 (2d ed. 2008) (showing how liability for government officials for civil
rights violations only occurs when the defendant's conduct clearly violated established law); 2
SHELDON H. NAHMOOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 §§ 8:1-8:13 (4th ed. 2010) (highlighting that government officials are liable for
civil rights violations only where the defendant's conduct violated clearly established law).
48. 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
49. See id. at 3 (Garner was "reasonably sure" and "figured" that the suspected felon was
unarmed); see also Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 843-48 (providing a more extensive summary
of Scott v. Harris).
50. See Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d at 813-14 ("An automobile has been held to constitute a
deadly weapon."); accord, Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL 25419527, at *6-*7.
51. Because the Court was so certain as to the facts, it decided the case as if Tennessee v.
Garner applied in the car chase context but did not make a definitive legal pronouncement in this
regard. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376-77 (2007).
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and against Harris by concluding that there was no legitimate factual
issue as to the reasonableness of the deputy's car bump maneuver
because the speeding Harris vehicle unquestionably posed a substantial
threat of death or serious injury to the public. 52  Justice Stevens
dissented. 53
The Court focused primarily on videotapes of the chase made by
cameras mounted on the pursuing police cars that switched lead pursuit
positions at times. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia described the
videotape as presenting the Harris vehicle "racing down narrow, two-
lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast."54
Seeing the fleeing car "swerve around more than a dozen other cars,
cross the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions
to their respective shoulder to avoid being hit" as well as "run multiple
red lights" while often traveling in the wrong lane and being pursued by
police cars was enough for the majority to deem Harris a danger to the
public, justifying Scott's disabling (to both the car and Harris)
maneuver.55
In dissent,56 Justice Stevens described the majority as engaging in a
de novo review of the type that was "buttressed by uninformed
speculation about the possible consequences of discontinuing the
chase." According to Justice Stevens, the tape "actually confirms,
rather than contradicts" the lower courts' appraisal of the factual
questions at issue. More important, it surely does not provide a
principled basis for depriving the respondent of his right to have a jury
evaluate the question" of deadly force.57  Particularly powerful is
Justice Stevens's observation that although the videotape might lead the
52. Id. at 384-86.
53. Id. at 389 (Stevens, J.. dissenting). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg wrote separate
concurrences but did not question the accuracy of Justice Scalia's characterization of the
videotape. See id at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring); Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 379 (majority opinion).
55. Id.
56. Justice Ginsburg concurred, noting the fact-specific inquiry required to decide cases
concerning alleged excessive force, but did not appear to question the majority's ironclad
assessment that Scott's decision to run Harris off the road was reasonable under the
circumstances. as a matter of law. See id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J.. concurring). Justice Breyer also
concurred, also noting the fact-based nature of the inquiry, suggesting that this might make it
more efficient for trial courts to decide questions of official immunity first to avoid the necessity
of determining disputed facts. See id. at 387 (Breyer, J. dissenting). But Justice Breyer also
appeared not to question the majority's analysis of the video. Id. at 387-88; see also id. at 387
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing the Breyer concurrence as "agree[ing]" that the videotape
"demonstrates that the officer's conduct did not transgress Fourth Amendment limitations"
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
57. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
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majority to view the chase as reasonable, inferring reasonableness from
evidence is for the jury.
In contrast to the majority opinion, the Stevens dissent marshals the
facts of record to make a strong case that running Harris off the road,
however stupid his decision to flee, was both unreasonable and
unnecessary. The dissent points out facts soft-pedaled or ignored by the
majority: that the police had the Harris license plate number and knew
where he lived; that by the time of the fateful collision, Harris's vehicle
was on the open road and posed less threat than it may have a few
minutes earlier; that the police could have used "stop sticks" to puncture
and gradually deflate the tires of Harris's car since they knew where he
was going and essentially could have had him cornered and unable to
escape, so long as the police displayed patience. 58
Persuasively, Justice Stevens noted that "[w]hether a person's actions
have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best
reserved for a jury" and that the majority had "usurped the jury's fact-
finding function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the four other
judges to review the case unreasonable." 59 Demonstrating that one need
not necessarily look across cultural divides to find divergent perception,
the dissent observed that "[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so
vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances
surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable
juror could disagree with this Court's characterization of events."60
As good as it is, even the Stevens dissent tends to overlook facts
favorable to plaintiff Harris. As previously noted, Scott supposedly had
no information about the infraction that led to the chase or whether
Harris was a dangerous felon, facts that might have informed his
judgment about whether to run Harris off the road. 61 Neither did the
58. Id. at 390-97.
59. Id. at 395.
60. Id. at 396.
61. Id. at 375 (majority opinion). The Supreme Court majority reviewed the facts but failed to
note that Scott had no information about the genesis of the chase nor knew whether Harris was a
dangerous criminal or simply an adolescent acting foolishly. Id.; see also Harris v. Coweta Cnty.,
433 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that Scott lacked this background, that the dispatcher
did not know "how the pursuit originated, the speeds of the vehicles, the numbers of motorists or
pedestrians on the roadways, or how dangerously Harris was driving." and that the dispatcher
"also did not request further details about the pursuit prior to authorizing the PIT"); Coweta
Cnty.. 2003 WL 25419527, at *2 (showing a series of interviews with individuals describing why
they fled from law enforcement authorities). But in a videotaped interview available on the
internet, Scott states that he was aware that the immediate cause of Harris's flight was speeding.
See Why I Ran (Crime & Investigation Network broadcast Oct. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.hulu.com/watch/225429/why-i-ran-christievictor (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) see also
Brian L. Frye, A Reasonable Aan, VIMEO (Apr. 3, 2011), http://vimeo.com/21897714 (short film
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police dispatcher who gave Scott permission to "take out" Harris,62 a
wording choice that a reasonable jury might have found consistent with
excessive use of force. Further, Scott failed to execute the precision
maneuver he had been authorized to undertake, one that was designed to
make a fleeing car spin to a stop without leaving the road or flipping
over.63 Scott had never even been trained in this maneuver. 64 All of the
jurists reviewing the matter seem to have overlooked that a reasonable
jury could see Scott's conduct as an angry overreaction to being hit by
Harris's vehicle, another fact consistent with excessive use of force. 65
Quite amazingly, not one of the thirteen judges and Justices who
reviewed the case noted that Harris was African American while Scott
was white. Surely, a reasonable jury could take this into account in
deciding whether the force used by Scott, perhaps motivated by racial
animus as well as anger over the damage to his vehicle, upset at what
appeared to be scofflaw behavior, and agitated because of the adrenaline
rush of the chase was excessive under the circumstances. 66  The
prospect that police in a state in the Deep South might be unduly
aggressive when dealing with a black motorist in flight certainly cannot
be dismissed and may help, along with other contextual factors, explain
that pairs the chase scene with soundtrack of the Supreme Court oral argument).
62. Scott. 550 U.S. at 375 ("Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to
[g]o ahead and take [Harris] out."').
63. Id. ("Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a 'Precision
Intervention Technique ('PIT') maneuver, which causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop."');
see also Coweta Cnty.. 433 F.3d at 810 (noting that Scott radioed a general request for
"permission to PIT [Harris]" and describing a PIT maneuver as "a driving technique designed to
stop a fleeing motorist safely and quickly by hitting the fleeing car at a specific point on the
vehicle, which throws the car into a spin and brings it to a stop"): Coweta Cnty.. 2003 WL
25419527, at *2 n.3 ("Scott wanted to use the maneuver to end the chase as soon as possible
because he felt that Harris was acting in a reckless and extremely dangerous manner. At the time
the request was made, there were no motorists or pedestrians in the area, which was due, in part.
to the Peachtree City officers' decision to blockade intersections.").
64. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375 (discussing Scott's decision to use PIT maneuver and dispatcher
authorization but failing to note that Scott was not trained in PIT); Coweta Cnty.. 433 F.3d at
810-11 (noting that Scott requested to use and was given permission for PIT maneuver although
"Scott had not been trained in executing this maneuver" and that "[Scott] and other Coweta
officers did not undergo a training on PITs until after the incident"); Coweta Cnty., 2003 WL
25419527, at *3 (highlighting that Scott and other officers were not trained in PIT).
65. According to the dissent, "'stop sticks' are a device which can be placed across the
roadway and used to flatten a vehicle's tires slowly to safely terminate a pursuit." Scott, 550 U.S.
at 397 n.9 (Stevens. J.. dissenting).
66. The audio portion of the chase video includes Scott volunteering to be the officer who
brings Harris's vehicle to a stop because Scott's vehicle has already suffered physical damage
from the parking lot collision. We know that Harris is black and Scott is white because they both
appear (separately) in a most affecting video in which they give their respective accounts of the
incident. See Why I Ran, supra note 61.
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why Scott took action that seems (at least in retrospect) so excessive
relative to the situation.
The Stevens dissent, unlike the majority opinion, respected the
traditional "rule" of litigation that fact issues such as witness credibility
and whether particular events took place are for the jury. But as
demonstrated by the saga of Scott v. Harris, we know that at least five
very accomplished jurists would have deemed it reasonable if a jury had
found excessive use of force under the circumstances of the chase.
Further, none of the Justices hearing the case appeared to recognize that
watching a video is one thing, while having it introduced by and
interpreted by those involved in the matter is another, an exercise that
might lead to a different perception than simply viewing the video in the
isolation of judicial chambers.67
Thus, simply as a self-contained set of three judicial opinions, Harris
v. Coweta County cum Scott v. Harris is highly problematic on its face.
The Supreme Court's majority decision started to look even worse in
the wake of the Kahan et al. study. As previously noted, Professors
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman showed the Scott v. Harris car chase
video to 1350 respondents, who in turn gave their opinions regarding
the videotape. 68 Unlike the nearly unanimous Supreme Court, the
respondents of the Kahan et al. study exhibited a wider variety of
opinions, with younger persons, women and minorities all considerably
less willing to find the police officer's actions clearly justified. Many
observers had just the opposite reaction, seeing the interception tactic of
the police as clearly unjustified under the circumstances. The Kahan et
al. study found that the respondents "all varied significantly in their
perceptions of the risk that Harris posed, of the risk the police created
by deciding to pursue him, and of the need to use deadly force against
Harris in the interest of reducing public risk" and that these "patterns
suggest the influence of value-motivated cognition." 69
67. See infra text accompanying notes 185 243 (describing the benefits of the trial process for
illuminating evidence such as the videotape).
68. See Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 838.
69. See Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 903-04 (citation omitted). As discussed further in this
Article, I am noting the degree to which the cognitive illiberalism observed by Professors Kahan.
Hoffman, and Braman undermines the case for aggressive use of summary judgment, just as does
much research on heuristics and biases, cognitive traits in humans, and behavioral law and
economics. A full discussion of the Whose Eyes analysis. particularly the authors' suggestion of
how the Court could and should have decided the case, is beyond the scope of this Article, save
that I must note that I do not necessarily agree with their solution to the Scott v. Harris problem
and may even oppose it to the extent that their suggested alternative grounds for decision would
have the effect of similarly removing such cases from jury consideration.
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The Kahan et al. study thus reveals a Court majority that quite clearly
was wrong about the range of reasonable jury responses to the videotape
(to say nothing of examination of the evidence generally). Reasonable
people, quite a few of them in fact, did not find that the video clearly
exonerated the police. By highlighting the divergence of perception and
its correlation with demographic traits, the Kahan et al. study further
undermined the already shaky majority opinion.
The Scott v. Harris majority's blinders as to the range of reasonable
reactions to the videotape are revealed even when the tape is shown to
an audience that logically should see the tape as would a court. During
Spring Semester 2011, students in a civil procedure class at the William
S. Boyd School of Law-UNLV watched the Scott v. Harris chase video.
Afterward, they expressed their views on the Scalia and Stevens
perceptions of the videotape.
This group was considerably more homogenous than the Kahan et al.
sample. There were only two African-Americans in the class and fewer
than ten with Hispanic surnames, although the class was evenly divided
by gender. By definition all the students had graduated from college
and had been successful enough according to traditional college
standards to gain admission to law school. Nearly all were from middle
class or upper-middle class backgrounds. Except for its comparative
youth, it appeared the type of group that-at least according to the
Kahan et al. results-was reasonably likely to back Justice Scalia rather
than Justice Stevens on this one.70 But instead of mirroring the Court,
the class divided as follows: approximately a third supported the Scalia
characterization while another third agreed with Justice Stevens and the
remaining third thought the accurate assessment was somewhere in
between.
Although a large number were proud to stand with Justice Scalia, the
results are instructive. First, this type of classroom episode, which has
probably occurred throughout the country over the past four years,71
supports the Kahan et al. study, even in a group of mostly white kids
eager to become part of the establishment. If this group of largely
privileged, economically secure Caucasians about to become lawyers
cannot be near-unanimous in its agreement with the Scott v. Harris
70. This is a bit of an oversimplification of the Kahan et al. results, which suggest that
attitudes toward controversies like that in Scott v. Harris vary primarily according to respondent
attitudes toward hierarchy vs. egalitarianism and individualism vs. communitarianism and other
aspects of risk assessment. But in the study's sample, respondent attitudes on these dimensions
were often correlated with demographic factors such as race.
71. Other civil procedure professors have reported similar division among their students when
assessing the Scott v. Harris chase video.
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majority about police conduct, this strongly suggests the Court majority
was in error in finding the facts not genuinely open to dispute and was
perhaps in error on the merits of its characterization that the chase was a
danger to the public.
Second, when the class was asked the follow-up question, "How
many agree that summary judgment was appropriate?" almost no hands
went up. Even the majority of those who saw the chase Justice Scalia's
way acknowledged that other reasonable persons might disagree.
Within seconds, they saw a compelling sample of these reasonable
people-their classmates-disagreeing in substantial proportion.
Third, this group of future lawyers seems to instinctively grasp the
perils of cognitive illiberalism about which the Kahan et al. study
authors warned and, like Justice Stevens, appears to readily recognize
that when judges argue that a scene can be described in only one way,
the judges are acting more like jurors and violating the long-standing
rules of summary judgment civil procedure. When they saw (with their
own eyes), they believed their own eyes but also realized that other eyes
might see the matter differently.
THI. COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM AND ITS COUSINS
As noted above, Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman define
cognitive illiberalism as "failure to recognize the connection between
perceptions of societal risk and contested visions of the ideal society."72
The term is most associated with Professor Kahan, who appears to have
coined it and certainly has been its most prominent intellectual
entrepreneur. In his writings, he has argued that much of the division of
society, including prominent culture wars over sexuality, guns,
smoking, climate change and the like stems from the respective groups
differing views of the facts, in large part because people perceive, filter,
and distill facts to fit their pre-existing world views.73
The cognitive illiberalism concept is part of a broader cultural
cognition project in which Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman are
important figures along with Mary Douglas, 74 Paul Slovic,75 and others
72. Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 838.
73. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, supra note 22, at 115 25 (arguing that
certain divisions in society result from varying views of facts that comport with people's pre-
existing world views).
74. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 60
(1996) (discussing "group" and "grid" world views that shape human perceptions according to
whether a person is more or less communitarian or individualistic in group outlook and more or
less hierarchical or egalitarian in orientation).
75. See, e.g., PAUL SLOVic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 152 (2000) (noting the degree to which
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whose work deals with the degree to which variance in individual and
group attitudes colors their views of the factual world. According to its
own self-description, The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law
School is "a group of scholars interested in studying how cultural values
shape public risk perceptions and related policy beliefs." 76  Cultural
cognition "refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs
about disputed matters of fact . . . to values that define their cultural
identities." 77 A major theme of the Project is that people form differing
belief structures that stem from their diverse cultural perspectives and
orientations. Particularly important is a person's predisposition as
individualistic or communitarian and hierarchal or egalitarian. 78
The cultural cognition movement and the concept of cognitive
illiberalism are important developments in our understanding of human
perception and reasoning. The concepts are a sub-part of a larger body
of knowledge which shows that people-even very intelligent, well-
trained professionals-are subject to a variety of cognitive failings and
are far from perfectly accurate in their perceptions or rational in their
analyses. 79 A large body of cognitive science, which also travels under
the banner of behavioral law and economics, 80 shows that humans
consistently make a wide variety of reasoning errors. Among these is a
variant cultural and cognitive traits of persons shape their perceptions of facts and risks).
76. See THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, ww.culturalcognition
.net (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
77. Id.
78. Kahan et al.. supra note 15, at 859-62; accord, DOUGLAS. supra note 74. at 54-68
(diagramming the group and grid world views and separating whether an individual is
independent of other people's pressures versus controlled by them); see also Dan M. Kahan &
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 150
(2006) (arguing that a correlation exists between beliefs of completely different public policy
issues, meaning that a person's beliefs on one topic can be predicted based upon his or her
understanding and opinion of a totally separate topic).
79. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN. PAUL SLOVIC & AMos TVERSKY. JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 18-19 (1982) (explaining that experiments with human
subjects show people to regularly make data processing and reasoning errors in decision-making);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1224 (1974) (finding that rational thought was impeded by people's unconscious, and
reflexive thinking had a tendency to make cognitive shortcuts). The work of Tversky and
Kahneman was particularly important in the development of cognitive science research and has
been frequently invoked in analysis of legal policy as well as spawning a large volume of related
literature about the degree to which human reasoning is prey to factors other than pure rationality.
80. See, e.g.. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1-5 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (finding
that the study of behavior law and economics is essentially the study of human decision-making).
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 6-11 (2008) (claiming that human decision-making is
flawed and that enacted policies are often dictated by the way people process and make
decisions).
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tendency to see the world in a preferred way and to fail to realize that
others could see the world in quite a different way, as addressed in the
cultural cognition and cognitive illiberalism literature.
But beyond these sorts of reasoning errors, there are basic cognitive
constraints that bedevil all humans whatever their cultural leanings.
Among these traits are undue adherence to socially constructed
preferences, 8  extremeness aversion, 82  hindsight bias, 83  optimism
bias, 84 status quo bias, 85 bounded rationality, 86 the availability
heuristic, 87 the anchoring heuristic,88 and loss aversion. 89
81. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 80, at I (claiming that "[h]uman
references and values are constructed rather than elicited by social situation" and '[a]lternative
descriptions of the same choice problems lead to systematically different preferences')
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 186 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1996)). See
generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 80 (discovering that people's preferences, outlook,
and opinions can be molded by the framing and wording of choices).
82. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 80, at 3 ("People are averse to
extremes. Whether an option is extreme depends on the stated alternatives . . . . As between
given alternatives, most people seek a compromise."). See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 80, at 217 (finding that people have a general preference for maintaining the status quo).
83. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 80, at 4 ("A great deal of evidence
suggests that people often think, in hindsight, that things that happened were inevitable, or nearly
so. The resulting 'hindsight bias' can much distort legal judgment.").
84. See id (labeling the trait "Optimistic Bias" and noting that "[e]ven factually informed
people tend to think that risks are less likely to materialize for themselves than for others"). See
generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 80. at 25-26 (finding that people tend to expect good
outcomes, even in the face of evidence to the contrary).
85. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 80, at 4 ("People tend to like the status
quo. and they demand a great deal to justify departures from it . . . [and] evaluate situations
largely in accordance with their relation to a certain reference point."). See generally THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 23 24 (explaining how people use anchor points in decision-
making).
86. See Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1656 (2009)
("People often rely on intuitions driven by attention to highly salient information rather than
careful, reflective analysis, emotions rather than reason, and other heuristics that lead to
'boundedly rational' rather than fully rational decisions."); see also Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204-06
(2003) (stating that people are not fully rational and logical but are influenced by their own
preconceptions as well as the context and design of situations). See generally THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 17-39 (noting the importance of "choice architecture" to human
decision-making).
87. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 80, at 5 ("People tend to think that risks
are more serious when an incident is readily called to mind or 'available.' If pervasive, the
availability heuristic will produce systematic errors."). See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN,
supra note 80, at 24-26 (explaining that the likelihood of a person believing that a negative
outcome scenario is more likely to occur increases when an example is very closely related in
circumstances and time as well as how well known it is by that person).
88. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 80, at 5 ("Often people make
probability judgments on the basis of an initial value or 'anchor,' for which they make
insufficient adjustments. The initial value may have an arbitrary or irrational source. When this
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Related to optimism bias and perhaps to status quo bias is a general
tendency of persons to think they are better (at everything) than is really
the case. This type of self-serving bias of course affects us all. But
because judges hold enormous power and can often wield that power
individually without the moderating influence of others (at least until
appeal), this trait is a particular cause for concern. Consider the
following passage from an article co-authored by prominent federal
district court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin: "For all their virtues, juries
cannot contribute much to the effort to define sexual harassment better -
by granting summary judgment in proper cases and carefully reviewing
jury findings, however, judges can." 90 However, the broader cross-
section of the jury and the benefits of the trial process are useful
counterweights to a judge's potentially idiosyncratic or erroneous view
of the facts.91
In addition,
[o]ne of the psychological mechanisms that accounts for cultural
cognition is NaYve Realism, which refers to a psychological tendency
to attribute the perceptions of those who disagree with us to the
distorting impact of their political predispositions (the Realism part)
without being sensitive to how our own predispositions might affect
our own perceptions (the Nalve part). 92
These cognitive and cultural traits make dispassionate rational
analysis more difficult even in judges who have not a shred of what is
normally described as unconscious racial, gender, or ethnic bias. An
important contribution of the cognitive illiberalism and cultural
cognition project is to emphasize that differing perceptions are not
entirely the result of immutable race or gender differences (for example,
the study found reduced perceptible difference in reaction to the video
according to the sex of the respondent and the findings were not
is so, the probability assessment may go badly wrong.").
89. See id. ("People are especially averse to losses. They are more displeased with losses than
they are pleased with equivalent gains-roughly speaking. twice as displeased."). See generally
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 33 34 (finding risk aversion and loss aversion common
for most people).
90. See Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 813, 852 (1999) (displaying confidence that judges, through their sophisticated
legal training, will more frequently reach sound results in sexual harassment cases than lay
persons).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 185-243 (describing the benefits of the trial process for
uncovering evidence).
92. See Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology in," or "Cultural Cognition of" Judging: What Difference
Does It Make?. 92 MARQ. L. REv. 413, 420 (2009) (citing Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual
Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Narve Realism" in Intergroup Perception and
Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 (1995)).
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statistically significant). 93 Nor are divergences among judges and other
humans purely the product of ideology or favoritism. As Professor
Kahan has observed, ideology and values may have a subconscious
influence on judges but they may not be the motive for their decisions.94
Even if not intentional, result-oriented, or corrupt, basic orientations
about society and its ordering can powerfully determine how disputed
facts are assessed and the inferences drawn from the same piece of
evidence.
The ensuing policy question presented is the proper response of the
judicial system to this "new" information. At least in the slice of the
legal system dealing with summary judgment, courts should become
much more hesitant to grant summary judgment-at least in cases
where the decision turns on whether there exists a genuine factual
dispute.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT'S TRACK RECORD: NOTHING To BRAG ABOUT
As discussed above, one would expect the affirmance rate in fact-
based summary judgment cases to approach 100% because, by
definition, a court rendering summary judgment has determined either
that the facts are uncontested (and, as discussed below, that the dispute
between the parties is only one of law) or that no reasonable factfinder
could agree to the nonmovant's contentions. To the extent the actual
affirmance rate is significantly lower, this suggests that trial judges are
being too aggressive in addressing summary judgment motions.
Even if "law-based" summary judgment motions comprise a
substantial portion of the cases on appeal, perhaps even a majority, a
significant reversal rate suggests problems and probably plenty of
cognitive illiberalism. Similarly, a significant reversal rate regarding
law-based summary judgment is problematic as well in that it may
indicate problems with the analytic abilities of trial courts, excessive
case loads precluding adequate time for research and reflection,
inadequate law clerk selection or support, or other factors in lieu of
cognitive illiberalism. It might even indicate actual bias, prejudice, or
lack of impartiality that is more overt than cognitive error regarding
narrowness of focus or excessive confidence in one's own abilities.
93. See Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 868-69 (discussing some gender differences in
response to the Scott v. Harris chase video but noting that they were not statistically significant).
94. Kahan, supra note 92, at 413. But see Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 415 (noting that
values could provide partisan motivation for decisions).
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In addition, of course, using reversal rates as a means of assessing the
correctness of trial court summary judgment practice may itself be
misleading. Perhaps the trial courts had it right and the appeals courts
had it wrong in reversing a "law-only" summary judgment. The trial
court may have had a sounder view than the appellate court (or two of
three members of an appellate panel). But for better or worse, the rule
of a legal system is that the final decision of the highest court hearing
the matter is the "correct" decision for purposes of assessing the quality
of lower court decisions. Regardless of finality and hierarchy, reversal
reflects disagreement among the bench, a bench composed of
reasonable people. But summary judgment is not supposed to be
granted unless reasonable people could not disagree. Consequently,
reversal, even if resulting in incorrect decisions, strongly suggests the
case was not apt for summary judgment. 95
With these caveats, an examination of the fate of summary judgment
on appeal appears to strengthen the case of its critics more than its
supporters. As a general rule, trial court decisions appear to be affirmed
roughly 60% of the time.96 One would expect summary judgment to
have an even better track record on appeal because by definition the
motion is to be granted only when there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, no need for credibility determinations, and the law clearly
directs a particular result. Even under the post-trilogy regime that
permits judges to make too many resolutions of contested facts or favor
the judge's inferences over those a jury might render, one would still
expect a better than average affirmance rate if the judge is correct in
concluding that his or her view of the evidence is by far the most
reasonable. Unless the judge is taking the trilogy even farther than its
already judge-empowering boundaries, one would expect something
approaching a 100% affirmance rate, particularly since the judge has
95. Even without considering the fate of summary judgment on appeal, the pattern of
summary judgment practice at the trial level raises some cause for concern. For example. it
appears that defendants obtain summary judgment at nearly twice the rate of plaintiffs (roughly
50% for defendants and roughly 30% for plaintiffs). See Edward Brunet, Presentation of
Summary Judgment Efficiency at the Seattle University School of Law 25th Anniversary
Summary Judgment Trilogy Colloquium (Sept. 16, 2011). Although this is perhaps justified
because a plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, it does not explain why summary judgment
occurs in civil rights cases at a 70% rate while succeeding in tort or antitrust cases at roughly a
5 0 % rate. Id.
96. See KUERSTEN & SONGER, supra note 12, at 62-65 (noting a general aftirmance rate of
roughly 6 0 %); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in
State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 L. & Soc'Y REv. 403. 415 (1987) (finding that although
rates do vary among jurisdictions, affirmance rates still are not even close to approaching 100%).
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discretion to withhold summary judgment if not firmly convinced it is
the right course of action for the case. 97
Instead, we find that summary judgment on appeal fares no better
than the bulk of cases reviewed and falls far short of the near-perfect
track record it logically would have on appeal if being properly
administered at trial. For example, one study found that summary
judgment opinions in one federal circuit were affirmed at a 70% rate.98
Although this is not a horrendous track record, neither is it anything
about which summary judgment proponents should crow. Recall that
even more problematic trial court decisions tend to be affirmed 60% or
more of the time and that summary judgment affirmance theoretically
should approach 100%. In addition, the appellate court in question (the
Seventh Circuit), generally known as a conservative court, has some
judges who have publicly disparaged the bona fides of many job
discrimination claims. If this is the best summary judgment can do in
this sort of hospitable environment, it would nonetheless appear that
trial courts are too aggressive in granting the motion.
The same is true regarding summary judgment appeals overall. One
study found a general affirmance rate of 61% for grants of summary
judgment,99 roughly the same rate of success on appeal as other
dispositive acts by the trial court (dismissal generally had the same
affirmance rate of 61%),oo while the affirmance rate for Rule 50
motions was 55%.101 Trial judgments were affirmed at the slightly
higher rate of 6 8%.102 Notwithstanding the claims of defenders of the
trilogy regarding the wonders of summary judgment, entry of the
motion is overturned nearly half the time and fares no better on appeal
than other trial court orders notwithstanding that the substantive
97. See Gensler, Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment, supra note I1, at 47 (outlining the
amount of discretion judges have regarding summary judgment); see also Gensler, Afust, Should,
Shall, supra note 11. at 1142 (examining judicial discretion and judges' ability to withhold
summary judgment).
98. See Paul W. Mollica, Employment Discrimination Cases in the Seventh Circuit, I EMP.
RIGHTS. & E1P. POL'Y J. 63. 75-78 (1997) [hereinafter Mollica. Employment Discrimination
Cases] (showing an increased trend in courts granting summary judgment in the Seventh Circuit)
accord, Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 141
(2000) [hereinafter Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide] (examining statistical
trends in summary judgment).
99. See CROSS, supra note 12, at 51 (finding that summary judgment grants were affirmed at a
61.l1% rate). Where the plaintiff (who bears the burden of proof) obtained summary judgment,
the reversal rate is slightly higher. Id. at 52.
100. Id. at 51 (61.1% affirmance rate).
101. Id. (55.1% affirmance rate for J.N.O.V. motions).
102. Id. (68.0% affirmance rate).
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standard for summary judgment suggests it should be relatively immune
to being overturned on appeal.
This rough success rate of 60% and perhaps 70% appears to hold
across jurisdictions and types of cases, without the significantly greater
success (much less the near perfect success) one would expect for
summary judgment.103 But in some subcategories of cases, affirmance
rates can approach 90%.104 Consequently, one might expect something
more than just the "average" affirmance rate for summary judgment and
to further expect that where summary judgments are reversed, they will
at least be "law only" decisions as contrasted with trial court grants
based on the supposed absence of fact disputes, only to have an
appellate panel find disputed facts. Yet the system reflects such
decisions, 105 which strongly suggests that trial courts have simply been
too willing to impose an individual judge's view in cases where there
might be a range of reasonable jury responses.
A leading treatise construing one study described a "19 percent
reversal rate for . . . summary judgment and a comparable 15 percent
reversal rate for all civil appeals."1 06 Similarly, the treatise notes that
"[d]ata collected by Judge [William] Schwarzer [a strong proponent of
summary judgment], for example, shows that the reversal rate for
103. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab. Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?. 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 105 (2009) ("While win
rates in the trial court vary from high to low across case categories, affirmance rates in the
appellate court are elevated for all kinds of cases."); Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J.
562-63 (2003) (finding that plaintiffs in such cases do worse than plaintiffs generally, but
significant number of trial court dismissals or grants of summary judgment are dismissed);
Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, supra note 98, at 180 (noting that despite the
popularity of the motion and frequency of summary judgment grants at trial, the affirmance rate is
roughly the same as with other cases).
104. See Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of
Publications, Citations and Reversals, 28 J. L. ECON & ORG. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at
7), available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/08/25/jleo.ewr014.full.pdf+html.
105. See, e.g.. Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter. Reasons for Reversal in the Texas Courts of
Appeals, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431, 445-49. 471 (2002) (finding on average more than 30% of
summary judgment grants reversed and reversal rates ranging from 20% to 45%, with more than
half the reversals due to appellate courts finding "the existence of some evidence raising fact
issues"). From 2001-02. reversal rates regarding jury verdicts and bench trials were 25% and
22%, respectively in Texas courts of appeals. Id; see also Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter,
Evaluating Appeals By the Numbers, 66 TEx. B.J. 768, 770 (2003) (noting a 33% reversal rate for
summary judgment cases). Although Texas state courts are obviously not part of the federal
judicial system where the trilogy is controlling law, Texas summary judgment practice is similar,
and the trilogy has been cited with favor by Texas courts. Id.
106. EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE §11:1, at 451 (3d ed. 2006) (citing Joseph Cecil, Trends in Summary Judgment
Practice. A Summary of Findings, I FJC DIRECTIONS II, 15(1991)).
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summary judgment motions did not vary substantially from the overall
rate of reversal for all civil cases" 107 and that "Judge Schwarzer
correctly concluded that this data should correct any misperception of
appellate inclination to overturn summary judgment dispositions." 08
Unless summary judgment has a much better record on appeal than
the average matter, perhaps something approaching a perfect record,
trial courts are by definition violating the "rules" of the summary
judgment "game" by taking too many liberties regarding fact finding as
well as erring on the law when such errors are unnecessary in light of
the bench's discretion to deny summary judgment.109
V. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN FACT-DISPUTE AND LAW-ONLY SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS
As discussed above, cognitive illiberalism and its cousins (e.g., false
certainty bias, false consensus bias,1 10 optimism bias, status quo bias,
loss aversion) refer to both intrinsic failure in human reasoning and
people's failure to appreciate that others can see things differently."
When a judge fails to see that his or her construction of the facts may
well not be shared by many others, the judge is being cognitively
illiberal as well as falling prey to a variety of cognitive errors. In short,
the judge erroneously thinks that his or her factual assessment is the
only reasonable factual assessment.
However, as previously discussed, this type of cocksure judging is
inappropriate. It violates the alleged rules of the civil procedure "game"
and invades the province of the jury. Although Professor Suja Thomas
107. Id. § 11:1, at 450 (citing William Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal
Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (1984)). Note that Judge
Schwarzer's study took place prior to the trilogy, suggesting that even under a regime more
protective on nonmovant opportunity to reach trial, appellate courts were finding, with some
frequency, that judges erred in finding no issue of fact or in improperly deciding issues of fact as
well as making mistaken assessments of the law.
108. See id. §11:2, at 450-51 (citing the data that Judge Schwarzer collected in support of the
notion that summary judgment rulings, specifically reversals, do not vary substantially from other
areas of appellate review); accord, Wald, supra note 7, at 1939 ("[S]ummary judgment fares quite
well on appeal. at least in the D.C. Circuit.").
109. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 106, §11:2, at 462 (discussing the amount of
deference appellate courts should give to a trial courts grant of summary judgment).
110. False consensus or false certainty bias is what occurs when people think that their view
of a matter is more widely shared by the populace at large than is the case. See Solan et al., supra
note 26, at 1268.
111. With apologies to Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman for taking license with their
more nuanced. culturally centered use of the term and its focus on differing visions of societal
risk and the ideal society. See supra text accompanying notes 72-94 (discussing cognitive
illiberalism and related theories).
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makes too sweeping a claim in contending that any grant of summary
judgment violates the Seventh Amendment, 12 she is correct that
decisions like Scott v. Harris and Ricci v. City of New Haven are not
only wrong but arguably unconstitutional applications of judicial power
because they involve the Court adjudicating genuinely contested
material issues of fact.113
For the reasons set forth below, judicial arrogation of the fact-finding
function is also inefficiently bad court management. When judges
resolve factual disputes that should have been left to the jury and are
reversed in significant percentage, this inevitably leads to waste, added
expense, and delay as well as unfair treatment. 114 Although the analytic
processes involved in this dance of dueling summary judgment may
illuminate issues and streamline some aspects of the eventual trial, it
clearly imposes an additional layer of legal activity and expense on
cases that might just as easily have been tried with less fanfare, either
reaching final adjudication or a settlement."'
In addition, there is a significant distributional question posed by the
reversal rates of grants of summary judgment. By definition, these
summary judgment grants are erroneous. But they can only be proved
erroneous by claimants who have the resources to fund an appeal. In
relatively small stakes cases or where claimants are of modest means,
they may be forced to simply "lump" a bad summary judgment decision
because of the expense of appeal. Knowing that the bench may favor
their positions in such cases or that plaintiffs' counsel perceive a
112. See Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, supra note 3, at 158-60
(arguing that summary judgment conflicts with the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of right to
trial by jury).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 41-83 (describing and assessing Scott v. Harris).
114. For example, the nonmovant who should have been able to have a trial in Year Three
after a dispute does not obtain trial (whatever the result) until Year Five or perhaps even Year
Fifteen after a dispute. Although it is not the norm, some cases can become marathons in large
part because trial courts are overeager to grant summary judgment and are reversed and remanded
repeatedly, resulting in trial resolution (or settlement) years later than would have been the case in
the absence of summary judgment. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away From Rules
Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 355-56 (2010)
(describing instance of civil rights case based on a 1994 incident where two grants of summary
judgment were reversed, leading to settlement fifteen years after the incident rather than the three
to five years after the incident that would likely have been the case in the absence of summary
judgment).
115. Notwithstanding its insights, Professor Brunet's article in this Symposium does not fully
explain why the same differentiation between strong and weak claims could not just as easily be
reached at lower cost through the negotiation by reasonably talented and experienced counsel,
early neutral evaluation, or mediation. See Brunet. The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, supra
note 3, 694-95. Even court annexed arbitration, which entails a streamlined version of trial.
might be cheaper than the baroque motion practice that often accompanies summary judgment.
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disadvantage, defense counsel usually make summary judgment
motions in such cases and refrain from early settlement offers. 116
Judicial error regarding application of the law is of course different
than judicial error in resolving contested facts. The former, even if
unsuccessful on appeal, seems inherent in the nature of judging while
the latter looks like improper removal of the case from the jury.
Whether right or wrong, the system generally needs its judges to rule on
legal questions.11 7 Failure to do so arguably violates the Code of
Judicial Conduct.118 To refuse to do so even when the parties have
stipulated to agreed facts seems particularly inappropriate, at least at
first blush. In the past two terms alone, the Supreme Court has reversed
a number of summary judgment grants not because the trial court
resolved disputed facts but because the Court simply disagreed with the
trial court's legal conclusions. 119
116. Although anecdotal, the views related to me by plaintiffs' counsel in Nevada appear
consistent with broader research in the area. See, e.g.. Schneider. Dangers. supra note 3: Beiner.
supra note 3; McGinley, supra note 10; see also Stempel, supra note 114. at 355-57 (citing
instances where judges granted summary judgment despite facing records highly suggestive of
discrimination).
117. See Mollica, Employment Discrimination Cases, supra note 98, at 78 (arguing that
statutory construction cases, for example, "turn far less on the facts of the case (which are often
not materially contested) than on whether the statute covers the practice at all" and that "[s]uch
essentially legal determinations often warrant summary judgment because the court, rather than
the fact-finder, determines the scope of the statute"). But see Rebecca Silver, Note, Standard of
Review in FOIA Appeals and the Afisuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 731, 757
(2006) (finding that courts reviewing FOIA matters have slouched toward improper factual
determination by judges due to adoption of a standard of review that unduly permits interjection
of judicial fact assessment).
118. See AM. BAR Assoc., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7, at 21 (2011)
(requiring judges to sit on cases and discharge duties unless disqualified).
119. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 893 (2011) (holding unanimously that denial of
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds may not be appealed after a trial finding
officials liable unless they preserved sufficiency of the evidence issues through Rule 50 motion);
see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 715 (2011)
(reversing the Eighth Circuit's grant of summary judgment, and unanimously holding a Treasury
Department Rule to be valid and reasonable construction of a statute requiring medical residents
to be subject to FICA Social Security tax); Christian Legal Soc. Chap., Univ. Cal., Hastings v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (holding in a 5-4 decision that even though facts are
uncontested, when a student organization that denies membership in violation of the school's "all-
comers" provision summary judgment is not proper because there is an issue as to whether the
school used the membership policy as pretext for denying official school recognition); Jerman v.
Carlisle, McNellie. Rini, Kramer & Aulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1611-12 (2010) (overturning
the Sixth Circuit's grant of summary judgment under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
holding that 15 U.S.C. §1692k(c) did not provide for mistake-of-law defense to mortgage debtor
in default despite the Sixth Circuit's holding that it did). Law-only summary judgment decisions
of course occur at the state level as well. See, e.g., De Smet Ins. Co. v. Pourier, 802 N.W.2d 447,
447-48 (S.D. 2011) (granting summary judgment in favor of insurer because its exclusion from
coverage of accidents involving vehicle owned-but-not-insured by policyholder was valid and not
precluded by public policy).
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A certain amount of this is of course inevitable. But perhaps the
frequency of such reversals suggests that even these "nonfactual"
summary judgment decisions should be viewed with more caution.
Trial judges have discretion to grant summary judgment
notwithstanding the seemingly mandatory command of Rule 56.120
Perhaps that discretion should be more frequently exercised to refrain
from granting summary judgment as to legal issues, even when the
parties are stipulating to the facts. Further adjudication may develop
these seemingly arid facts more fully in ways that illuminate the legal
question. Additional delay may produce additional precedent to guide
the trial court. Or denial or deferral of summary judgment may prompt
settlement, obviating the need for the legal decision altogether.
Although failure to obtain summary judgment arguably increases the
settlement value of a claim, even a claim that would ultimately be
adjudicated to lack merit, this might be a price worth paying
(particularly if it is sufficiently spread through insurance or other
means) when compared to the cost of increased litigation that results
when courts decide legal questions on summary judgment only to be
reversed.
Even when the ultimate decision is one granting summary judgment,
disagreement between judges and courts suggests error and failure to
follow the language of Rule 56 and the ostensible rules of the road
regarding summary judgment. Scott v. Harris is such a case. Although
the result at the Supreme Court level was an overwhelming 8-1 victory
for the forces of summary judgment, the total vote of all judges viewing
the case was eight in favor of granting summary judgment with five
opposed.121 In a case where judgment was to be entered without trial
only if there was no genuine dispute of material fact, more than a third
of the jurists viewing the case thought there was such a dispute.
Summary judgment is not a plebiscite. It should be available only when
there is unanimity (at least among reasonable people).
120. See Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, supra note II, at 1140 (arguing that the use of "should"
instead of "shall" in Rule 56 indicates that judges have discretion in granting summary
judgment); see also Kennedy v. Silas Mason, 334 U.S. 249, 256 (1948) (holding that trial courts
have discretion to withhold summary judgment even when the movant has made a prima facie
case for grant of motion); ROGER S. IAYDOCK, DAVID F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION §12.3.11. at 533-36 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that
withholding summary judgment may aid in the development and appreciation of even largely
undisputed facts and lead to different adjudication outcomes).
121. Justices Scalia. Roberts, Kennedy. Souter. Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito were all
for summary judgment and five jurists were against (Justice Stevens, Eleventh Circuit Judges
Barkett, Cox and Birch, and Northern District of Georgia Judge Hunt).
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VI. RECOGNIZING COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM AS A CALL FOR GREATER
JUDICIAL HUMILITY AND RECOGNIZING THE ABILITY OF TRIAL TO
COUNTERACT PROBLEMS POSED BY COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM
Although lay jurors of course will exhibit many of the same traits that
make judges imperfect, the jury by definition involves a combination of
individuals that logically mutes the extremes produced by cognitive
error, cognitive illiberalism, conscious or unconscious bias, or different
reasoning styles. Further, jurors combine differing life experiences. In
addition, the trial judge supervising a case will make evidentiary rulings
and give instructions designed to reduce jury errors. If this combination
and cross-fertilization fails to sufficiently suppress human divergence,
myopia, or misjudgment, a trial judge stands by to grant judgment as a
matter of law or a new trial as necessary.
The judge will be policing (and potentially upending) jury verdicts
through the use of post-trial Rule 50 motions and motions for a new
trial, but the judge's assessment will be informed by the events of trial
and an opportunity for first-hand observation rather than just review
over the documentary exhibits included in a motion for summary
judgment.122 This colloquy between judge and jury is likely to produce
more accurate determinations and is preferable to summary judgment
unless the proponents of more aggressive summary judgment can carry
the burden of demonstrating substantial cost and time savings.
Recent litigation events in the news provide a good example of what
appears to be apt judge-jury interaction that eschews summary judgment
but provides useful professional constraint upon lay assessment. The
software giant Oracle sued Swedish software company SAP, contending
that a SAP subdivision improperly expropriated Oracle's intellectual
property. SAP conceded the bulk of the allegations but took the
position that the improper appropriation had little benefit to SAP and
relatively modest (by commercial standards) cost to Oracle, essentially
conceding to damages in the $20 million range. The case proceeded to
trial, with a California jury (Oracle is based in Northern California)
awarding much higher damages of $1.3 billion. SAP moved for a new
trial, contending that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
The trial court agreed and granted a conditional new trial unless Oracle
agreed to remittitur of $272 million.123
122. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 162 72 (discussing the relationship between judge and jury
following the Supreme Court's trilogy of summary judgment opinions).
123. See Judge Tosses $1.3 Billion Verdict Against SAP in 'Web Scraping' Case. 2011 WL
4056143 (WJCOMPI) (Sept. 14. 2011) (describing the litigation and remittitur); Jordan
Robertson, Oracle SAP Lawsuit Verdict Overturned: Judge Rules Against $1.3 Billion Penalty,
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This is exactly the type of judge-jury interaction and judicial control
that should be celebrated. The court did not prejudge jury issues
through summary judgment and allowed a full development of facts at
trial. But when the jury rendered a seemingly excessive verdict that
could not be objectively justified, the court required a new trial unless
the verdict winner was willing to accept a reduced award that was
nonetheless far higher than the damages conceded by the defendant.
Where remittitur is accepted, it by definition ends the case, which would
appear to be efficient. Where remitter is rejected, the parties are not
deprived of eventual jury consideration, and the judge is not acting as a
jury of one in setting an amount, which would occur if the court decided
damages on a summary judgment motion.
Judicial policing of the jury at trial or after verdict does not, of
course, eliminate the interjection of judicial bias (overt or unconscious)
or preclude judicial decision-making that reflects cognitive illiberalism,
cultural cognition, or heuristic error. But it logically reduces these
problems because it permits the judge to be better educated by the
events at trial, the expression of views beyond those of the judge's
cultural circle, or both.
If there is to be any judicial dethroning of the jury at all, it logically
comes at or after trial rather than during the pretrial vacuum of
summary judgment. Cognitive illiberalism and its cousins are not
ejected from the proceedings, but their influence is reduced. Unless
forgoing the earlier application of a single trial judge's view of the
record is wasteful, summary judgment should be used more sparingly.
When coupled with the division of the bench itself regarding the
contents of the video (in which eight Justices squared off against five
jurists who disagreed), the results of the Kahan et al. experiment cast
serious doubt on not only the result in Scott v. Harris but also on the
wisdom and even the integrity of the Supreme Court majority, which
clearly seems to be flaunting the long-standing procedural rules
surrounding summary judgment and civil litigation generally (i.e., that
resolution of disputes of fact, including the inferences drawn from a
given fact situation, are for the jury rather than the court). Coupled with
the Court's similar and relatively recent displays of excessive judicial
certainty in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblyl 24 and Ashcroft v.
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2011, 7:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/01/oracle-
sap-lawsuit-verdict-overturned n_945512.html (discussing Oracle-SAP litigation).
124. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to
turn the allegations from conceivable to plausible).
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Iqball25 -which also received harsh scholarly criticism1 26 -the distaste
generated by the oddly cocksure Scott v. Harris opinion brings to light
once again the undue affinity for summary judgment held by a judicial
body that has had precious little trial court experience.127
Trial court experience should not be a litmus test for the Court any
more than professorial experience should be disqualifying.128  But the
Justices in the modern era have had a disturbingly narrow set of life
experiences for purposes of assessing the judge-jury relationship.
Although one not need to be a mechanic to drive a car, it still seems
logical that Justices (or appellate judges) should have more familiarity
with juries in operation prior to determining the ranges of reasonable
responses a jury may give when viewing evidence, a key implicit
element of the summary judgment calculation. To the extent the bench
is more removed from real juries and real trials, the more restraint is
cautioned in granting summary judgment.
But even if reviewing appellate judges and Justices are highly steeped
in jury experience, a respect for the cognitive errors of humanity, its
express and implicit biases, its differing perspectives and experiences,
and the tendency toward cognitive illiberalism augurs in favor of
caution regarding summary judgment. The Kahan et al. study of Scott
v. Harris in particular reflects the degree to which the bench can widely
miss the mark regarding the range of assessments normal human beings
might have regarding contested facts. 129
125. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
126. See supra text accompanying note 5 (noting scholarly criticism of Twombly and Iqbal).
127. The Scott v. Harris Court (which had not yet added current Justices Sonia Sotomayor, a
former trial judge. and Elena Kagan) contained only one member who had ever served as a trial
judge, Justice David Souter, who served on the New Hampshire Superior Court from 1978-83.
Justice Souter also appears to have had some trial experience at his previous firm, Orr & Reno.
where he "practiced a wide variety of law ranging from corporate law to general litigation."
David H. Souter, THE OYEZ PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/justices/david h souter (last visited
Mar. 23, 2011). Souter was also an assistant attorney general in New Hampshire and involved in
criminal prosecution for three years. Id.
128. The Court went through a long period after the 1962 departure of former Harvard Law
Professor Felix Frankfurter in which it contained no members who had been full-time academics.
But the latter part of the century became a relative cornucopia of scholarly membership with the
appointments of former Virginia and Chicago Law Professor Scalia in 1986 (but only after his
opinions as a member of the D.C. Circuit had been scrutinized), former Rutgers-Newark and
Columbia Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1993 (also after D.C. Circuit apprenticeship). former
Harvard Professor Stephen Breyer in 1994 (after First Circuit apprenticeship), and former
Chicago/Harvard Professor and Harvard Law Dean Elena Kagan in 2010. Justices Stevens (1975
appointment) and Kennedy (1987 appointment) had significant adjunct professorial experience.
129. See Kahan et al., supra note 15, at 845-60 (discussing the differing views the Justices
had regarding Scott).
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Although the Kahan et al. study focused on differences linked to the
demographic and ideological traits of the respondents, the degree to
which respondents in the same cultural cohort differed is perhaps even
more striking and buttresses the call for restraint in summary judgment
and increased judicial humility that goes beyond cultural differences.
Even persons with essentially the same demographic profile may differ
significantly in their assessments. A cookie cutter jury of card-carrying
white collar Republicans from suburbia will not be uniform in their
assessment of many cases. Consequently, a single judge, even one with
sterling white collar Republican suburban credentials, should be highly
reluctant to intrude into this area of jury authority and highly reluctant
to conclude that contested evidence points in only one direction
regarding liability, culpability, or damages.
The Kahan et al. study itself emphasizes this aspect of human
perception and cognition. The authors introduce us to several
prototypes that illustrate different types of prospective jurors who vary
substantially regarding attitudes toward authority, risk, and
responsibility.130  One prototypical juror, Ron, is a self-made
millionaire who identifies himself as a conservative Republican who
wants limited government interference with markets. 131 In addition, the
authors created archetypes Bernie, a white male liberal Democrat, 132
Linda, a liberal black woman, 133 and Pat, who is something of a poster
child for a swing voter.134
130. See id. at 862 (citing two recognizable cultural styles to represent the influences, "aleph"
and "bet," with the Alephs holding conspicuous "hierarchical and individualistic cultural
worldviews" and leanings toward political conservatism, most likely to be affluent white males,
and the Bets holding disproportionate "egalitarian and communitarian views," most likely to be
more Democratic and liberal, as well as disproportionately African American and female).
131. See id. at 849-50 ("[Ron is] a white male who lives in Arizona, overcame his modest
upbringing to become a self-made millionaire businessperson. He deeply resents government
interference with markets but is otherwise highly respectful of authority, which he believes
should be clearly delineated in all spheres of life. Politically, he identifies himself as a
conservative Republican.").
132. See id at 850 ("Bernie, another white male [in addition to and contradistinction to Ron],
is a university professor who make a modest salary and lives in Burlington, Vermont. He will go
along with the left wing of the Democratic Party, but thinks of himself as a 'social democrat.' He
advocates highly egalitarian conditions in the home, in the workplace, and in society at large, and
strongly support government social welfare programs and regulations of every stripe.").
133. See id. ("Linda is an African American woman employed as a social worker in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She is a staunch Democrat and unembarrassed to be characterized as
a 'liberal."').
134. See id. ("Pat is the average American in every single respect: Pat earns the average
income, has the average level of education, is average in ideology, is average in party
identification, holds average cultural values, and is average even in race and gender.").
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So what happens when these archetypes view the Scott v. Harris
videotape? As one might remember from this Article's earlier summary
of the Kahan et al. study, there were significant differences in
perception of the car chase correlated with the race, ethnicity, age,
gender, political affiliation, and cultural worldview of the viewers. 135
Summarizing broadly, the authors concluded that "African Americans
took a significantly more pro-plaintiff stance" as did "Democrats
relative to Republicans, liberals relative to conservatives, and
Egalitarians relative to Hierarchs" while women were also "generally
more pro-plaintiff' as were lower-income subjects. But "less educated
subjects were overall more pro-defendant than were more educated
subjects" as were married subjects. In addition, "[o]lder subjects were
more inclined than younger ones to view the chase as not worth the
risk."136
Importantly, even among the Rons of the world, there was divergence
of opinion on such matters, just as not all Bernies, Lindas, or Pats were
in agreement about what the evidence "showed."
[A]pproximately three-quarters (76%, ±2%) of the persons who share
his [Ron's] defining characteristics disagree-about two-thirds (66%,
±3%) either moderately or strongly-with the proposition that the
chase "wasn't worth the danger to the public." Bernie and Linda, in
contrast, generally agree with that same statement: 59% (±3%) of the
persons who share Linda's characteristics either strongly or
moderately agree the chase wasn't worth the risk, and another
considerable slice (18%, ±4%) "slightly agree"; 73% (+3%) of the
persons who share Bernie's characteristics agree (about half
moderately or strongly) that the chase wasn't worth it. Pat leans
toward Ron but is equivocal: 55% (±2%) of the members of the
general population (according to the simulation) reject the claim that
the chase wasn't worth the risk to the public, but the median citizen is
only "slightly inclined" toward the position.
. . . Much like the majority in Scott, Americans on average
(represented by Pat) are strongly disposed to see Harris as a lethal
menace: over 85% believe (more than 70% either moderately or
strongly) that he posed a risk to the public, and about 80% believe
(over 60% either moderately or strongly) that he posed a deadly risk to
the police. People who see the world the way Ron does hold the
beliefs even more decidedly.1 37
135. See id. at 858-70 (noting that viewers from different demographics had differing
reactions to Scott v. Harris video).
136. Id. at 867.
137. Id. at 873-75; see also id. at 875 79 (providing a further summary of the data).
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Impressive associations to be sure. But even strong majoritarian
agreement is not the same as unanimity or consensus. Even when
dealing with only conservative white men, such as the archetype Ron,
one out of four persons saw the chase video differently than did the
Scott v. Harris majority, while the "average" Pats of society were close
to evenly divided in many ways. Similarly, substantial segments of
"liberal" juror types were still inclined to resolve disputed facts
favorably to law enforcement. 138
By definition, then, reasonable people-even reasonable people in
demographics with strong majorities on one side of the issue-
disagreed over the material facts of Scott v. Harris and their ultimate
resolution. The Supreme Court's failure to appreciate this divergence
within the venire (even homogenous subsections of the venire)
truncated the adjudication process and prevented full and proper airing
of the dispute.
America is a land that worships winners. 139 For example, political
commentators regularly characterize elections where the winner obtains
55% or more of the vote (and certainly more than 60% of the vote) as
runaway or landslide victories.140 But such thinking badly overlooks
the degree to which there is significant division of opinion and a strong
counter-perception of situations and outcomes.
Applied to politics, this may reflect only sloppy description and
linguistic slouching (soon, perhaps, even those obtaining 51% of the
138. See id. at 868-69 (summarizing data); id. at 873-79 (providing extensive verbal
summary of data after further analysis); see also, e.g., id. at 879 (finding that more than 80% of
Rons believe the police acted reasonably. which still leaves nearly one-fifth of the conservative
white male group against the police and the Supreme Court majority on the ultimate issue).
Similar significant minorities of the other archetype groups differed from the majority of their
peers.
139. And they need to be current winners. As the photographer Weegee famously put it,
"You're as good as your last picture. One day you're a hero, the next day you're a bum." See Jan
Morris, New York's Golden Age. N.Y. MAG., Oct. 6. 1986, at 48. 56.
140. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593,
623 (2002) (defining "landslide" when the winner received 60% or more of the vote); Richard .
Pildes. The Constitution and Political Competition. 30 NOVA. L. REV. 253. 254 (2006) (defining
"landslide" as a margin of victory of 20% or more): Bradley A. Smith. Vanity of the Vanities:
National Popular Vote and the Electoral College, 7 ELECT. L.J. 196, 202-03 (2008) (noting that
296 stories referred to Reagan's 1980 victory with 50.1% of the vote as a "landslide"). Even
where the term is relatively appropriate, it unfairly overlooks the significance of the minority
perspective. For example, Democrat Lyndon Johnson defeated Republican Barry Goldwater in
the 1964 presidential election by a 61% to 39% vote. See CONG. Q., GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS
461 (3rd ed. 1994). But this means that Goldwater's strong conservative views enjoyed the
support of more than a third of the electorate totaling millions. This is hardly an insignificant
expression of opinion that should be ignored. Similarly, Republican Ronald Reagan in 1984
defeated Democrat Walter Mondale by a similar ratio: 59% to 41%. See CONG. Q.. GUIDE TO
U.S. ELECTIONS 466 (3rd ed. 1994) (describing the results of the 1984 Presidential election).
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vote will be seen as "landslide" winners). By contrast, summary
judgment is uncomfortably like having a political commentator decide
that the likely winner of the election is so obvious that no election is
required. Even where the pundit is someone well-regarded across the
political spectrum, this would be cause for concern. The analogy is of
course imperfect but serves to illustrate the wisdom of actually allowing
the contest (election or trial) to proceed in order to eliminate legitimacy
concerns no matter how clear the eventual winner may seem. 141
More important is the role that minority perspectives play in
adjudication. Although electoral supporters of an underdog have a
theoretical chance of persuading others to join their cause or to abandon
the opponent, there is no requirement that these competing perspectives
be placed in a crucible of deliberation. Indeed, this is part of the
problem of cognitive illiberalism. Members of particular cultural
groups appear simply not to be very open to hearing and considering the
perspectives of other social groups. Judges (and certainly eight of nine
Justices in Scott v. Harris) displayed this same insularity.
But jury deliberation is different. The majority and minority
perspectives are thrown together in the courtroom, exposed to the same
evidence, given the same jury instructions, and forced to deliberate until
the jury reaches a unanimous or overwhelming majority vote. 142
Through the process of deliberation (reviewing and assessing the
evidence, sharing different views, attempting reconciliation, clashing
and perhaps compromising or yielding), the jury arrives at a decision
that may be quite different than what would have taken place if the
jurors had simply voted their preferences.
As a result, it is at least theoretically possible that a single sufficiently
tenacious juror will turn around a group if the dissident juror's analysis
141. The election cannot be cancelled because it is at the core of a working definition of
democracy. By contrast, the rules of civil litigation permit appropriate grants of summary
judgment. My point is simply that courts need to be more accurate and certain before granting
summary judgment and that excessive grants move legal error closer to something we would all
regard as abominable: the substitution of a single person's assessment in lieu of a promised
election.
142. Even where jury determinations are by majority vote rather than unanimous agreement, a
supermajority usually required a 10-2 or 11-1 vote for twelve-person juries or a 5-1 vote for six-
person juries. Recall that even among the Ron jurors highly likely to support the police in Scott v.
Harris, the rate of support for the plaintiff was between twenty and thirty percent depending on
the question asked in the study. In other words, the minority of Rons in a jury composed
completely of Rons may be sufficient to prevent a verdict in support of the police under either a
unanimity or a supermajority standard. If the subgroup of white conservative males willing to see
things Harris's way is not swayed by the peer pressure of the jury majority, it is able to prevent a
determination favorable to the police and in a criminal analog to Scott v. Harris could prevent a
criminal conviction.
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and arguments are sufficiently persuasive to the group. Certainly, we
all want to believe it is possible for even a sole righteous (and correct)
juror to turn the tide. The play Twelve Angry Men was a hit on
Broadway and on the screen for exactly that reason. 143 Actual socio-
psychological research supports this notion that when persons are forced
to have substantive discussions on the merits, the assessments and
decisions of the group as a whole can change.144
At the risk of sounding excessively rosy about the chances that jury
deliberation will move people too far from their overall preferences and
pre-conceived notions, it is important to note that jury deliberations are
different than faculty meetings, board meetings, town meetings, and the
like (including the legislative process, despite its necessity and arguable
advantages over the forgoing groups), where attendees are usually
homogeneous and easily subjected to outside influences. These
differences promote rational decision-making, strengthen the role of
dissidents and similarly strengthen the case for restrictive use of
summary judgment that might otherwise smother the potential benefits
of these deliberations in too many cases.
In the organizational or political context in which we normally see
deliberation, it can result in sound decision-making even without the
safeguards of the jury. But the jury operating correctly within the
judicial system appears to hold the prospect for improving deliberative
outcomes-or at least dampening the effects of bias, prejudice,
cognitive heuristic error, and cognitive illiberalism.
First, the jury venire is randomly drawn. 145  Following the law of
averages, most jury pools are diverse relative to other decision-making
143. See TWELVE ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957). The movie is based on a 1954 teleplay
by Reginald Rose. The movie and play involve a jury deliberating in a murder prosecution with
the jury initially heavily slanted in favor of conviction and wishing to reach a verdict quickly. A
lone juror (Henry Fonda in the American movie version: a more recent Russian version also
exists) stands up to those rushing to judgment by quietly and firmly raising questions and
eventually the jury realizes that not guilty is the apt verdict. Although overly romanticized, the
play captures the ability of the jury process to adequately air minority perspectives that normally
are overlooked or too quickly dismissed in social activities and politics.
144. See generally Glyn Elwyn & Talya Miron-Shatz, Deliberation Before Determination:
The Definition and Evaluation of Good Decision Making, 13 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 139 (2009)
(discussing proper deliberation and how it generally improves assessment and decision-making).
See also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1541-62 (1992) (arguing that deliberative aspects of expert administrative
law regulation leads to better outcomes and justifies bureaucracy notwithstanding objections that
it is anti-democratic); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 74-75 (1985) (arguing for civic republican deliberation as a partial antidote to raw interest
group competition in politics and government).
145. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) (stating in the "Declaration of Policy" that jurors are
selected at random from a "fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein
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groups such as those listed above. 146 Even if through some quirk of the
draw or the highly homogenous composition of the community, a jury
composed entirely of Rons is likely to have a wide enough distribution
of Rons to include the one-fifth of this white male conservative
archetypical group willing to see things from the plaintiff s perspective.
Second, the actual jury is shaped by attorneys and judges to reduce
the prospect of bias, prejudice, distraction, inattentiveness, or inability.
Prospective jurors may be challenged for cause. 147  Each side is
provided with a minimum number (usually three) of peremptory
challenges to prevent the seating of prospective jurors about whom
counsel simply has doubts.148  Although judges1 49 and members of
the court convenes" and that all citizens shall have the opportunity and obligation to serve as
jurors); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2006) ("No person shall be excluded from service as a grand
or petit juror in the district courts of the United States . . . on account of race, color, religion, sex.
national origin, or economic status"): 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2006) (noting that only a limited list of
factors-e.g., illiteracy, inability to speak English, lack of citizenship, mental or physical
infirmity, or criminal record-precludes service as ajuror).
146. The jury selection process is much improved from fifty years ago when the lists from
which the venire was drawn tended to over represent the white and comparatively well-off.
Today, courts use a variety of sources for assembling the venire resulting in a considerably more
representative jury pool than in times past. Despite the imperfections of the jury pool. the
relevant (and relative) question is how the jury compares to other deliberative or decision-making
bodies. Compared to judges, legislatures, faculties, corporate boards, and the like, the jury looks
like a wonder of random distribution. For example. the federal bench is significantly whiter and
more male than the nation as a whole. RUSSELL WHEELER, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/
2009/08_federaljudiciary wheeler/08_federaljudiciary wheeler.pdf.
147. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN.
art. 1765 (establishing the right to challenge prospective jurors for cause in federal and selected
state courts). See generally SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 2. at 452-53 (noting availability of for
cause challenges); R. Brent Cooper & Diana L. Faust. Procedural and Judicial Limitations on
Voir Dire-Constitutional Implications and Preservation of Error in Civil Cases, 40 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 751, 753-54 (2009) (explaining the importance of voir dire and the implications of a jury
with preconceived attitudes about issues in civil litigation): Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. & Randal H.
Sellers, Picking Juries. Questionnaires and Beyond, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 370, 372-76 (2008)
(discussing potential juror dismissal based on jury questionnaire answers).
148. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. RULES D. MAINE, R. 47; U.S. DIST. CT. RULES D. OR., Civ LR
47-3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-13 (West 2012). See generally EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., I FED.
JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 3.03 at 66 70 (3rd ed. 1987) (discussing peremptory challenges in federal
court): Id. § 3.014. at 47-58 (discussing federal rules for examining prospective jurors): 3 22B
IND. PRAC., CIVIL TRIAL RULE HANDBOOK § 47:4 (citing three peremptory challenges possible
for each side in civil trials in Indiana, which may be used only on regular jurors, not alternates);
SUBRIN ET AL., supra note 2. at 457-63 (describing peremptory challenges).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (providing for disqualification of federal judges due to
particular financial or familial interests in a matter or where there exists a reasonable question as
to the judge's impartiality); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. supra note 118, at 25-27
(discussing general rules for judges to disqualify themselves that have largely been adopted by
states).
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other deliberative bodiesl50 may be restricted from participation in cases
of outright conflict or demonstrated concern regarding impartiality,
there is generally less protection in this regard outside the jury
context.151
Third, at the outset of the case the judge orders jurors not to discuss
the case informally until they begin their deliberations.1 52  This
admonition removes or at least reduces the scourge of most meetings:
pre-meeting lobbying by the parties most interested in the outcome.
Although some amount of pre-meeting or pre-vote lobbying may be a
necessary evil in order to avoid marathon meetings, it carries costs. The
lobbyist's recounted anecdote or statistic given in the hallway to a
member of the legislature is not displayed for all to see and cannot be
challenged (at least not directly or in timely fashion) by skeptics or
opponents. One board member's lunch with two others prior to the
meeting of the full board may contain similar problematic
communications that are never adequately aired and vetted before the
full body. Although individual jurors of course begin to make
assessments as they hear the evidence and argument,153 at least there is
150. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CONG. ETHICS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CODE OF
CONDUCT 4-6 (2011). available at http://oce.house.gov/pdf/OCE Code of Conduct.pdf
(describing congressional ethics rules that do not require legislators to be complete strangers to
affected parties, which is the case for jurors); Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners'
Box: Lobbying Regulations in State Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW. 375, 376-77 (2008) (discussing
congressional ethics rules).
151. A significant number of states (but not yet a clear majority) provide a litigant with the
opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge to the judge initially assigned to a case. See
Charles Gardner Geyh. Why Judicial Disqualification Matters, Again, 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 718
(2011) (urging greater availability of peremptory challenges of judges); Deborah Goldberg et al.,
The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503.
526-27 (2007) (urging peremptory challenges of judges as key component in preventing
favoritism and improving public confidence in courts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of
Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification-and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance
Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual
Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 789 93 (2011) (discussing the use and benefits of peremptory
challenges of judges). Such automatic recusal of judges based on litigant or lawyer concern is not
available in federal courts, although a litigant with sufficient evidence of actual bias (rather than
mere concern over impartiality) may obtain recusal through the affidavit of prejudice process of
28 U.S.C. § 144, which has been so narrowly interpreted by the courts that it is seldom used. 28
U.S.C. § 144 (setting the procedure for a party to establish the bias or prejudice of a judge).
Under the more widely involved 28 U.S.C. § 455, particularly the general "doubts about
impartiality" provision of § 455(a). the trial judge makes the initial assessment as to his or her
impartiality, and a decision not to recuse is generally not reviewable until conclusion of the
matter. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (setting the procedure for a judge to recuse himself in cases where is
impartiality may be questioned).
152. See 775B AM. JUR. 2D TRIAL § 1382. 167-68 (describing general bars on juror
discussion of case prior to deliberation).
153. Some litigation literature suggests that jurors largely make up their minds after the
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an effort to prevent those assessments from hardening until the entire
jury can discuss the case.
Fourth, jurors are required to base their decisions on the controlled
record in the case. Jurors may not conduct independent research and are
instructed to avoid external sources of information. l54 Their knowledge
of a dispute is (at least in theory) not distorted by newspaper articles,
websites, conversation, etc. from sources that may be incorrect or
biased. To be sure, these attempted controls may at times be honored
more in the breach than in the observance,155 but at least there are these
attempted controls. By contrast, most other decision-making bodies are
opening statements section of the trial. See James W. McElhaney, Taking Sides: Wat Happens
in the Opening Statement, 78 A.B.A. J. 80, 80 (1992); Kenneth J. Melilli, Succeeding in the
Opening Statement, 29 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 525. 525-26 (2006) (citing a study that indicates
that eighty percent of jurors claim to make up their mind after opening statements). But at least
these jurors are prevented from voting until they have heard much more and are required to
expose their assessments to those of other jurors who may disagree.
154. See NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH iH. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES §§ 7-11 to 7-15 (1st
ed. 1997) (jurors limited to case record in assessing dispute); Bennett L. Gershman,
Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 323 (2005)
(discussing actions that constitute jury misconduct); Robert P. MacKenzie III & C. Clayton
Bromberg Jr., Jury Misconduct What Happens Behind Closed Doors, 62 ALA. L. REV. 623, 623
25 (2011) (discussing the types of "outside influences" that can lead to jury misconduct): Amanda
McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its
Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 302 (2010) (discussing how the
use of modern technology leads to easier jury misconduct). For example, jury verdicts have been
set aside where jurors made unsupervised visits to accident or crime scenes or where a juror
conducted research or experimentation and then attempted to use this to persuade other jurors to
see the case in a similar way. See, e.g., Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13. 16 (2d Cir. 1994)
(setting aside the verdict because of juror's independent activity outside case record); Gibson v.
Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 853-55 (9th Cir. 1980) (overturning a jury decision because one juror
looked up and shared information outside the record).
155. Unless sequestered and supervised, jurors will have access to media accounts related to a
trial. Being human, many will undoubtedly be tempted to read media accounts. But because of
the admonition, even jurors who "cheat" are at least aware that use of external information is
wrong and will likely be better able to resist its influence and give greater credence to what
occurs at trial. Of course, even if jurors take very seriously the admonition not to read about the
case while the matter is in trial, jurors are throughout life exposed to external stimuli that. while
not directly on point, may have an impact on juror attitudes that in turn influences assessments
made at trial. For example, the insurance industry has, since at least the 1950s, been conducting a
public relations campaign designed to make the citizenry more resistive to plaintiffs' tort claims.
See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin. Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics of Idea:
Defining Public Policy Preferences, 1998 WiS. L. REV. 71, 77 n.21, 89 90 (noting insurance
industry advertisement in national magazine arguing that substantial jury awards result in
increased insurance premiums for the public at large); see also STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 12-15 (1995) (discussing the
advertisements produced by insurance companies to combat higher punitive damages).
Depending on one's point of view. this is democracy in action or a regrettable distortion of the
facts and an attempt to bias the venire.
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as a practical matter permitted to make important decisions based upon
clearly self-interested, tainted, or unreliable inputs.
Although judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that
avoids undue influence from suspect sources, there are few actual or
realistic controls on the bench. The system assumes that the legal
training, mental discipline, and experience of judges prevents them from
being unduly influenced by externally received information, but the
assumption is probably incorrect and in need of serious reexamination.
For example, recent years have seen what appears to be lobbying or
even attempted brainwashing of judges, or at least questionable judicial
interaction with interest groups.156
Fifth, the jurors receive a supervised presentation of the facts. Trial
proceeds in an organized fashion in which the jurors are forced to hear
both sides of the dispute without external distraction. A juror may think
he or she has heard enough and wants to decide the case (and go home
or back to work) after one side's opening or the first direct examination.
But the juror is required to hear out both sides and to sit (as attentively
as possible) through presentation of evidence and closing arguments.
During this process, rules of procedure, protocol, and evidence
control the manner in which the evidence is presented. They are
designed to foster fair presentation. Unlike discussions on the street, at
the local caf6, or on cable news networks, there are rules of the game
that if properly applied prevent lopsided presentation (due to bullying,
shouting, histrionics, intimidation, use of red herrings, etc.) but, at the
same time, permit assertions to be tested and assessed. On at least two
junctures in every trial (after the close of the plaintiffs case and the
close of the evidence), the court may intervene through a partial or
complete judgment as a matter of law to narrow the scope of
156. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 653-55 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing
growth of "judicial seminars" during the past thirty years in which "corporations that frequently
litigate in federal courts began contributing to nonprofit organizations, including law schools, to
fund the expenses of federal judges (and sometimes a guest) to attend 'seminars' often at posh
resorts at optimal times of the year [where golf] was a particular pastime along with the seminars"
and speakers "would often advocate perspectives on the law that were favorable to the corporate
sponsors"); see also In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to disqualify trial
judge from pollution case for attending seminar sponsored by the Foundation for Research on
Economics and the Environment ("FREE") (the acronym name gives one a flavor of the content)
but sounding "several cautionary notes" about judicial attendance at such events); CMTY. RIGHTS
COUNSEL. NOTHING FOR FREE: How PRIVATE JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE UNDERMINING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 5-7 (2000). available at http://tripsforjudges.org/crc.pdf (noting
that company-sponsored risk, environmental, or law/economics programs contained curricula
tending to advocate development, argue that economic growth was highly vulnerable to
regulation, suggest that particular regulations were excessive, and that development caused less
environmental damage than environmentalists contended).
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consideration or spare the jury deliberation over a case where the
outcome has become preordained.
After the evidence is in and before counsel's summation, the jury is
not left to its own devices but is given legal guidance by the court, both
as to the substantive law and the permissible conduct of jury
deliberation. If jurors have questions, they may ask the judge and
receive further clarifying instructions. Although jury instructions could
of course be improved, they are largely regarded as less legalistic,
clearer, and more helpful than in the past. However imperfect, jury
instructions stack up pretty well on clarity and information grounds as
compared to other pronouncements of the law.157 Then follows the
deliberation, which is also governed by rules (e.g., restricting outside
contact) and supervised by the court.15 8
Sixth, the evidence in the case is presented in a larger context through
the adversary advocacy of attorneys where no single piece of evidence
is enshrined or viewed in isolation. To apply a now famous aphorism,
lawyers are not "potted plants" that sit idly at trial. 159 Within the rules
of the game (e.g., no argument during the opening statement, pretrial
157. Jury instructions often do a very good job of distilling the rich complexities of law into
an understandable summary accessible to the laity. They often are officially approved and, thus,
enjoy the support of the mainstream of the profession. Even in systems such as the federal courts
where there are no officially endorsed jury instructions, the Devitt & Blackmar treatise has
largely assumed that role. See DEVITT ET AL.. supra note 148. at 21-99. In addition, problematic
jury instructions tend to be tested on appeal. with the resulting appellate opinion providing
clarification and improvement for use by trial courts in the future.
158. The courts take seriously the admonitions about proper jury behavior and resistance to
outside influences. For example. during the trial of a case that eventually reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, a juror was excused for what could be described as a reasonably innocuous and
short conversation about the trial with a non-juror. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION
ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL v STATE FARM 364-66 (2008) (noting that the trial judge
appeared to reach this decision because of wanting to err on the side of caution and fairness and
harboring concerns that the observed conversation might have been the metaphorical tip of the
iceberg); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408. 429 (2003)
(reviewing and vacating the trial court's large punitive damages award but on grounds unrelated
to juror behavior or supervision).
159. The phrase famously came up during Attorney Brendan Sullivan's representation of Col.
Oliver North during the 1987 Iran-Contra Hearings. Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI) was
questioning Col. North before a congressional committee when Sullivan objected, to which Sen.
Inouye replied that the witness could object if he so desired. Sullivan responded in mock horror
by noting that he was not a "potted plant" and that, as an attorney, his job was to object when
necessary to protect the witness. See Kim EISLER, MASTERS OF THE GAME: INSIDE THE
WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FiRM 141 (2010) (describing attorney Sullivan's representation
of Colonel North); LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND
COVER-UP 133 (1997) (depicting Sullivan's behavior and the dynamic of the proceeding); see
also Jeffrey W. Stempel. Tending Potted Plants: The Professional Identity Vacuum in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 12 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (criticizing the Court's decision as insufficiently
appreciative of the professional responsibilities of lawyers).
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evidence rulings limiting the interjection of prejudicial material),
attorneys present facts and arguments in a way designed to illuminate
the case for the jury. To be sure, they are doing it in a self-interested
way. But in addition to being required to behave ethically (e.g., no
fabrications, no innuendos on cross-examination without some basis for
asking the questions), lawyers face adversarial lawyers who will
challenge their presentations and give their own counter-narratives.
Despite these rules and the role of the lawyer, trials are in no way
Nirvana on earth, and the profession is often faced with problems of
lawyers getting away with improper behavior (e.g., stage whispers,
interjection of improper material, appeals to passion or prejudice). At
least in theory, however, courts should be controlling such behavior.1 60
Similarly, some attorneys are better trial lawyers than others and will be
more persuasive even if their case is not. But if these problems with
trials are considered so great that we must have a more aggressive
application of summary judgment, it would appear that the entire
rationale for the adversary system is in jeopardy. The system is
premised on the assumption that self-interested parties and counsel are
motivated to present their claims in the best light possible in a
manner-if properly supervised by a neutral judge-that results in
optimal illumination of the dispute for the jury (or a bench trial).161
This assumption is so established in the United States as to seem
irrevocable and strongly suggests that the adversarial motivations of
160. In practice. courts actually appear to be discharging this policing function with some
care. See Lioce v. Cohen, 174 P.3d 970, 974-86 (Nev. 2008) (reviewing four cases and finding
improper arguments and appeals to material outside the record that required the court to vacate
jury verdicts obtained in part of defense counsel's strident arguments that personal injury
plaintiffs were in essence being wimps, failing to take personal responsibility for their mistakes,
and would increase costs to others should they prevail). Of course, the fact that the Lioce court
had to review these cases and issue an extensive opinion setting ground rules for trial counsel
perhaps reflects that trial judges were failing to properly discharge their supervisory
responsibilities. But a case such as this suggests even more that the system as a whole takes the
playing-by-the-rules mantra seriously and attempts to prevent abusive attorney conduct.
161. See Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society, 30 THE
RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR CITY OF NEW YORK 535 37 (1975) (quoting a highly
regarded former federal trial judge as describing the adversary process as "a form of organized
and institutionalized confrontation" but one that has worked well despite concerns. "Experience
tells me that the adversary system has been good for liberty, good for peaceful progress and good
enough to have the public accept that system's capacity to resolve controversies and, generally. to
acquiesce in the results."): see also GILLERS. supra note 156, at 393-513 (describing the
adversary system and examining the ethical issues it presents); MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9-26 (1975) (setting forth a strong concept of adversary
system where the lawyers represent clients zealously rather than attempting to serve public
interest as well).
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counsel regarding presentation of the evidence make trial a substantial
improvement over the sterility of a purely paper record.
One of the misleading aspects of the Scott v. Harris video and
potentially misleading aspects of the Kahan et al. study is that the tape
was largely viewed in isolation and was not subject to the evidence
testing one finds in the heat of trial. To be sure, a video of an event is
normally good evidence. But it is hardly definitive or foolproof. At
trial, the videotape or any other piece of media evidence would not
simply be shown to jurors but would be first vetted and perhaps edited
by the court as a result of motions by counsel. The video would be
introduced by a live witness laying a foundation for what was to be
viewed and providing some background and context about the creation
of the video. Opposing counsel and the court would ensure that proper
foundation was laid, that the context and creation of the film was
examined, and that the potential limitations of the video and its ability
to mislead were presented to the jury.
Further, as shown in the case itself, even an important piece of
evidence usually cannot tell a conclusive story. The Scott v. Harris
video, for example, was a combination of two videos recorded by the
two pursuing police cars. The study video was comprised of portions of
each police car's recording, but it omitted certain portions of each
video-mainly the footage shot by whichever car was trailing.162
Although the study authors note that "[b]ecause only the footage shot
from inside the lead vehicle permits observation of Harris, the study
video nevertheless contained all portions of both tapes that bear on the
factual disagreements between the Scott majority and dissent,"1 63 the
description and disclaimer, as well as a little common sense, underscore
the degree that it is dangerous for factfinders to rely upon only one
piece of evidence. The video (actually two videos) may be powerful
evidence (and reaction to it differing greatly according to demographic
and cultural groups is important), but it is not the entire record. It is but
a slice of the record (however large a slice), and although the video is
direct evidence rather than circumstantial evidence, it is not evidence
that speaks for itself, at least not comprehensively. To be properly
understood, even evidence as important as this needs explanation,
context, and the sharpening of the advocates' debate as mediated by the
court's evidentiary rulings.
162. Kahan et al.. supra note 15, at 856 (footnote omitted). This was done to reduce the
length of the study video so as to prevent study subjects from dropping out. Id.
163. Id.
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Live trials provide this sort of richer, more comprehensive picture of
"what really happened" on the fateful night of the Scott v. Harris chase.
Jurors-and the presiding trial judge-immersed in these live trials
almost inevitably will better understand the video and the case in
general than they would on the basis of a summary judgment motion
and record alone. As a result, the ability of even demographically and
culturally distinct jurors to deliberate about what happened increases
and adds value to the fact assessment process. To the extent that the
jury's deliberation results in arguable error, the judge-better-educated
than he was before trial-is now in a good position to grant apt motions
and issue orders regarding verdict reduction, a new trial, or even
judgment as a matter of law should this be necessary.
Surely, this is an adjudicative improvement over summary judgment
in any case with serious factual clash. And, as amply demonstrated by
the Kahan et al. study and academic commentary critical of Scott v.
Harris, there was a pretty serious factual clash in Scott v. Harris. Add
to this the anecdotal but important datum of reaction to a mere slice of
the proof by the Boyd Law Civil Procedure/ADR 11 class of Spring
Semester 2011 (and apparently law students in civil procedure classes
throughout the nation). A group composed largely of Rons and Pats,
with a few Bernies and Lindas in the mix, was divided over the "true"
meaning of the video, and the video was arguably but a tip of the
iceberg of the entire record.
Supporters of the Supreme Court majority in Scott v. Harris might
counter that the record contained information in addition to the two
videos. Yet, this remains a far cry from the richer record that would
result at trial. Further, no matter how much one respects the work ethic
of the Court, one can harbor serious doubts about the Court's ability to
closely scrutinize the information in each case reviewed in light of the
Court's massive docket, especially when, like moths to a flame, the
Justices were drawn primarily to the videotape. It should be noted that
this is a Court that has delegated much of the scrutiny of petitions for
certiorari to its law clerks through the vehicle of the "cert pool" rather
than devoting the resources of individual chambers, much less the time
and energy of an individual Justice him or herself.164 Realistically, the
Court's review of the record will have gaps, oversights, and errors.
By contrast, jurors and trial judges are essentially forced to engage
closely with the entire record. In Scott v. Harris, it probably would
164. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process. 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 953 (2007) (noting the degree to which much certiorari
petition screening has been delegated to law clerks).
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have been quite illuminating to hear Harris, Scott, and others describe
the events of that evening as information supplemental to the video. In
addition, Harris's counsel would have undoubtedly argued, and perhaps
also presented expert testimony in support, that a camera strapped to the
nose of a police cruiser does not necessarily tell the entire story of an
event. Different perspectives, even if communicated orally rather than
by dueling videotapes, can not only create factual clashes, but also
provide factfinders with important additional information for resolving
those clashes.
As any casual sports fan can attest, the perspective and vantage point
of a picture is important. Football looks different depending on whether
the camera is in the end zone, at ground level, in the backfield, on the
sideline, in the quarterback's helmet, or aloft in the Goodyear Blimp.
The National Football League officially acknowledges the importance
of viewing perspective and vantage point by providing for review of
officiating calls upon challenge, with the review involving collaborative
viewing by the officials of the play in question from several camera
angles.165 At the risk of asking a perhaps unfair rhetorical question, one
might read Scott v. Harris and wonder: Why does the Supreme Court
not take the divergence of camera perspective as seriously as a sports
league? Although sports fans may figuratively live and die with their
team's fortunes, Harris was making a claim that would, to a large
extent, determine for all time whether he received adequate
compensation for his injuries and the type of life he would lead as a
quadriplegic.166
As the Kahan et al. study dramatically demonstrates, there can be
great divergence in the venire as to whether a video is clear. This
Article's additional attempted contributions to the insights of this study
165. See Chris Chase, The NFL's New Replay Review Rules Are Becoming a Debacle.
YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 19, 2011, 10:54 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown
corner/post/The-NFL-s-new-replay-review-rules-are-becoming-a?urn=nfl-wp7408 (pointing out
that instant replay reduces the possibility of making incorrect rulings); Tony Long, March 11,
1986: NFL Adopts Instant Replay, WIRED (Mar. 11, 2009). http://www.wired.com/science/
discoveries/news/2009/03/dayintech 0311 (describing the National Football League's adoption
of videotape review of controversial plays and officiating calls).
166. Although Harris would presumably have had access to government assistance programs
and may also have had other insurance or the ability to make additional non-frivolous liability
claims, government programs are not generally viewed as munificent programs. Without the
additional compensation or assistance provided by a favorable settlement or verdict against Scott
(whose liability would likely be covered by the county or the county's liability insurance) or other
law enforcement officials or agencies, Harris likely has far less money to obtain the type of
medical and rehabilitative care needed to live a reasonably comfortable, productive, and long life.
At the risk of being trite, his claim (regardless of its merit) was more important than any football
game.
2012] 673
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
are to suggest that: (1) there is enough divergence even among those
with similar cultural settings to preclude summary judgment and defer
to the trial process, and (2) the posited efficiency gains asserted by
summary judgment proponents are nonexistent or inadequate in view of
this public division and the track record of summary judgment on
appeal.
Seventh, jurors are forced to sit down and hash out their views of the
dispute. Unanimity and supermajority rules are designed to prevent
truncation of discussion based on an immediate plebiscite of the group.
Even if the jury is overwhelmingly in favor of conviction or inclined to
find no liability, there is usually at least a single dissident who must be
heard. 167 As a result, the jury is forced to sift through the evidence,
discuss it, address different perspectives, and examine the case in more
detail. Reflexive votes and snap judgments are discouraged.
As a practical matter, a juror whose assessment runs counter to the
majority tide (think of a Linda in a jury composed of Rons and Pats),
will be under at least some implicit pressure to yield to the majority and
let the jurors return to their lives. As Hans Zeisell 68 and Michael
Saks169 powerfully demonstrated some thirty years ago, the Supreme
Court probably made a serious mistake when it held that juries of as
small as six were sufficiently large to comply with the Due Process
Clause. 170 A person in the minority on an issue is much more likely to
hold out and require discussion in the face of supermajority opposition
167. Even when the jury is unanimous, the norm is that jurors discuss their preferences and
ask whether they are sufficiently certain to render a verdict on the basis of the initial straw vote or
whether further discussion is required. In some systems. the jurors are required to deliberate for a
reasonable time and are prohibited or discouraged from having an initial vote.
168. See Hans Zeisel, And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710, 710-21 (1974) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decisions permitting reduced
jury size and non-unanimous verdicts in the face of constitutional challenges: marshalling
psychological and social science literature suggesting that the presence of even a single ally
makes a substantial difference in an individual's willingness to oppose the majority
demonstrating that as a matter of probability, a larger jury is more likely to produce one or two
jurors differing from the majority assessment of a case).
169. See Michael Saks, Ignorance of Science is No Excuse, 10 TRIAL 18. 18 (1974) (showing
that in opinions approving smaller civil juries and non-unanimous juries, the Court betrayed a
misunderstanding of probability theory, and that the Court was particularly off-base in concluding
that the move from six jurors to five jurors posed constitutional challenges, while the move from
twelve-person juries to six-person juries did not).
170. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (holding that five-member civil juries
were inconsistent with due process); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 164 (1973) (finding that
six-person civil juries do not violate the Constitution); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365
(1972) (upholding a non-unanimous jury verdict against constitutional challenge); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-103 (1970) (upholding the conviction by a six-member jury).
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if this dissenter has even a single ally.171 Where the jury is larger, it
likely contains a more diverse composition, making it more likely that
there will be not one but two or more jurors who may be contrarian
enough to force meaningful review of the evidence and discussion
rather than permitting a relative rush to judgment after receiving jury
instructions.172 Consequently, some serious consideration should be
given to mandating a return to twelve-person civil juries as well as
cooling some of the feverish rush to summary judgment that has also
occurred in the past three decades.173
But even in juries of six (the constitutional minimum) or eight (the
norm in civil cases), there still are some reasonably good odds that at
least one juror (our hypothetical Linda) initially will have a different
view of the evidence that will in turn require some significant amount of
deliberation and may allow other jurors to see that they have been too
quick in their conclusions. But in many cases, a single dissenter will
probably eventually be worn down enough to concede. Linda, trapped
in a roomful of Rons, will probably not be able to turn the group
around, at least most of the time. But the Rons or Pats of the jury will
still be required to give serious consideration to Linda's views (or those
of a Bernie) before rendering a verdict. This is a more reflective means
of decision-making and more respectful of litigants and society than a
pretrial decision by a single trial judge.174
171. See Zeisel. supra note 168, at 711-20 (noting the importance of at least one ally to a
person's ability to resist group pressure).
172. See id. at 720 (describing how the ally phenomenon makes two dissident jurors much
more likely to hold out against the majority and that twelve-person juries provide greater
opportunity for dissidents and allies to be on a jury); Saks. supra note 169. at 19 (illustrating that
twelve-person juries provide significantly more likelihood of alternative orientations and
viewpoints than six-person juries).
173. At the conference that produced this Issue's collection of articles. I was pleasantly
surprised to find out that Judge Lee Rosenthal (S.D. Tex.) routinely uses twelve-person juries in
her cases. I thought juries of this size were no longer in use at all. But even if they are more
common than I realize, Judge Rosenthal's approach is a good one that should become standard
policy in courts.
174. In theory-and probably in practice-the trial judge is not so isolated. The law clerks
(two per chamber in federal court, usually one per chamber in most state courts) may provide a
different perspective. Although they have no vote in the process. their views are likely to be at
least considered by the trial judge. Similarly. trial judges in the privacy of chambers may use
secretaries or court deputies as sounding boards. Student externs may also provide some
additional perspective on the facts of a case. However, there is a tendency for judges to hire law
clerks with views similar to their own. Where the judge has a permanent clerk, this tendency may
be exacerbated.
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VII. THE WISDOM OF PLAYING BY THE RULES OF PLURALIST PROCEDURE
In a sense, the summary judgment jurisprudence from the last third of
the twentieth century to the present has been judicial activism in
derogation of what were supposed to be the agreed rules of the game.
Summary judgment, which began as a means of streamlining collection
actions where the debt was clear and unchallenged,175 was never
intended to permit judges to substitute their credibility determinations,
factfinding, and factual assessment for those of juries.176 This norm
was well established at the time of the enactment of the Federal Civil
Rules in 1938 and remained firmly in place until at least the 1970s. 177
Although there is evidence that trial courts were engaging in more
aggressive application of summary judgment prior to the 1986
trilogy, 178 summary judgment doctrine did not change until the
Supreme Court issued its now-famous opinions.179
175. Summary judgment was initially designed as a tool for plaintiff creditors to obtain a
judgment upon which they could begin to pursue payment without the delay of trial in cases
where the liability of the debtor and the amount were uncontested. Charles Clark & Robert
Samenow. The Summary Judgment. 38 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1929).
176. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 133-38 (reviewing scholarly literature, transcripts of
original advisory committee meetings, and other records of the committee suggesting that
summary judgments were not apt where there was any dispute of witness credibility or conflicting
evidence as to the happening of events).
177. See id. at 166-74 (reviewing case law reflecting a strong judicial hesitance to grant
summary judgment if there was any question as to the existence of facts or the inferences to be
drawn from uncontested facts).
178. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the frequency of summary judgment
grants prior to the 1986 trilogy).
179. See, e.g., Marcy J. Levine, Comment. Summary Judgment: The Majority View
Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme Court. 37 EMoRY L.J. 171. 177-78 (1988)
(portraying the trilogy as a drastic break from prior summary judgment practice). But see supra
note 7 (finding an upturn in summary judgment motions and grants during the decade prior to the
trilogy). What is of course interesting about the studies suggesting a silent trial court move
toward more aggressive summary judgment prior to the trilogy is the degree to which trial courts
had moved toward (or in my view, slouched toward) more aggressive summary judgment even
without the benefit of a favorable Supreme Court precedent. Until the trilogy, Supreme Court
precedent remained seemingly resistant to summary judgment. See Stempel, supra note 2, at
144-56 (discussing summary judgment case law and secondary authority generally providing that
such motions should be denied if there was even what the judge regarded as comparatively little
factual support for the nonmovant). For example, Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962), a case so
resistant to summary judgment that it was criticized by many. continued to be widely cited as
controlling law. But see, e.g., Martin Louis. Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice
Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 721 (1984) (urging that
in defamation cases, First Amendment concerns animating the doctrine protective of the media
reflected in cases like N.Y Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) urged stronger use of summary
judgment because of the high burden placed on defamation cases involving public officials or
public figures); David Sonenschein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment
Context: A Better Approach. 78 NW. U. L. REV. 774. 785-86 (1983) (urging that summary
judgment be used more like directed verdict/judgment as a matter of law and that the nonmovant
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Prior to 1986, the basic rules of summary judgment, even if honored
in the breach by some trial courts, were well-established. Summary
judgment was not to be granted so long as the nonmovant had any
legally relevant evidence on its side, evidence that a jury could rely
upon to render a verdict for the nonmovant. In assessing a summary
judgment motion, the trial court was not to consider the credibility of
witnesses or documents and was not to engage in factfinding regarding
disputed matters, including the range of permissible inferences that
could be drawn from agreed facts or circumstances. 8 0
The issue of whether facts are sufficiently genuinely disputed to
make summary judgment inappropriate may involve a question of "fact
existence"-whether certain tangible claims (e.g., was the light red or
green at the time of the collision) are correct-and "fact inference"-
what range of reasonable conclusions can be drawn from the same
tangible evidence lying in plain sight for jury consideration.i 8 1 The
latter category of fact disputes is just as much a genuine dispute of fact
as the question of whether pavement was dry, a door was locked, or a
light was on.
Although criticized by some as an insufficiently used and ineffective
set of rules, there was nothing to suggest that the summary judgment
doctrine prior to the trilogy was sufficiently "broken" as to need repair.
Prior to the trilogy, despite an uptick in summary judgment grants
during the 1970s, the Rule 56 doctrine nonetheless required judges to
deny the motion if there was any non-fabricated claim that favorable
facts supported the nonmovant or that non-psychotic juries might make
factual inferences in a manner favorable to the nonmovant, even if the
judge saw the fact inferences sought by the movant as more likely to be
embraced by the jury.
In other words, prior to the trilogy, it was nearly inconceivable that a
court would grant summary judgment to a defendant on the basis of a
videotape like that in Scott v. Harris. The video was simply too open to
interpretation, as well as not being the only item of evidence in the
matter. Under the pre-trilogy regime, even if a judge thought the video
reflected a dangerous driver who needed to be stopped, summary
be required to produce substantial evidence in its favor rather than merely any evidence or even
significant evidence).
180. See ROGER S. HAYDOCK. DAVID F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL. FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 12.4 (1985) (setting forth pre-1986 summary judgment doctrine); JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., II MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.02 (2d ed. 1985) (explaining when
summary judgment is appropriate).
181. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 162-70 (elaborating on the difference between fact
existence and fact inference).
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judgment would be denied, and the matter of factual inference would be
left for the jury. The ensuing two decades of work regarding cognitive
science, cultural cognition, and cultural illiberalism have affirmed the
wisdom of this approach. Reasonable people looking at the same events
can reach different conclusions, 182 making it unwise and inappropriate
(as well as in derogation of the jury function) for a judge to impose his
or her preferred approach.
The Court's 1986 decisions took a significant doctrinal turn and
delivered an even more substantial connotative message that trial courts
should be willing to grant summary judgment more often in a wider
variety of cases. The trilogy gave judges figurative permission and
unduly wide discretion to dismiss competing views of the evidence.
Unless the judge found the evidence, either asserted direct evidence or
requested inferences from the record, sufficiently compelling,
"substantial," or "plausible," the judge was now empowered to grant
summary judgment in situations where summary judgment was
impossible (at least if the doctrine was applied properly) prior to the
trilogy.
Although Celotex Corp. v. Catrett can, notwithstanding the flaws
about which Justice Brennan complained in dissent, be regarded as an
opinion merely clarifying practice, eliminating the tendency of some
courts to insist on affidavits in the record, and implicitly placing an
undue burden on movants, my view is that it also improperly replaced
what had been an "any evidence" standard for finding adequate
discharge of the nonmovant's burden in resisting summary judgment to
a "substantial evidence" standard that permitted more judicial fact-
weighing.183 Matsushita v. Zenith and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby were
jurisprudential disasters in that they squarely placed the Court (and by
implication all lower federal courts) in the fact-finding business in
derogation of both the jury and the trial process because Matsushita
dismissed the plaintiffs proffered evidence while embracing the
defendant's submissions on economic theory,184 while Liberty Lobby
182. See Dan M. Kahan et al., "They Saw a Protest": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (viewers of a tape of protest differed
in their likelihood of finding that speech crossed the line into unprotected conduct depending on
what the viewers were told about the people and activity on the tape).
183. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 154-169 (explaining the different positions of summary
judgment the Court has adopted over time and the subsequent confusion among lower courts in
trying to interpret those positions).
184. See id at 108-114 (re-examining the Court's errors in the Matsushita decision and its
possible rationale).
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allowed judges to further weigh facts by considering whether there was
a heightened burden of proof at trial.185
In the twenty-five years since the trilogy, the courts, following the
lead of the Supreme Court, have steadily pushed the envelope in favor
of more aggressive summary judgment.186  Certainly, the Court,
emboldened by the trilogy of its own making, has supported express or
de facto summary judgment in highly problematic ways. Scott v. Harris
is perhaps the best and most troubling example-one that would be
inconceivable without the trilogy and the "permission" it granted judges
to slouch toward factfinding. In conjunction with this over-eager
imposition of summary judgment is the Court's willingness to convert
Rule 12 motions to dismiss into summary judgment motions as took
place in Twiqbal.187
This change in the rules and shift in judicial attitudes had been
brewing since the 1970s,18 8 with the 1983 Amendment to Rules 11 and
16189 and the 1986 trilogy serving as something of an official send-off
185. See id. at 114-29 (analyzing Liberty Lobby and how the Court departed from its
traditional approach to summary judgment cases).
186. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text (discussing academic criticism of increased
summary judgment); see also Wood v. Safeway, 121 P.3d 1026, 1030-31 (Nev. 2005) (adopting
the trilogy at the state court level).
187. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (noting the degree to which the Twiqbal
decisions shifted the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants and substantial scholarly
criticism of Twiqbal); see also Burbank & Subrin, supra note 5, at 403-08 (criticizing Twiqbal).
188. In addition to the creeping advancement of more aggressive summary judgment
chronicled by the Federal Judicial Center and in other studies, see supra note 7 and
accompanying text, the 1970s ushered in concern, much of it led by then-Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, about perceived excessive litigation and the need to scrutinize claims more closely and
restrict access to the courts. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-
door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, II OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 297, 312-317 (1996) (describing the "Pound Conference" organized by
Chief Justice Burger, which operated under an assumption of excessive litigation and a need for
increased promotion of ADR and other responses as something of a kickoff for a new era of more
restrictive attitudes toward civil litigation). The Conference was officially titled the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, and its
proceedings were published at 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). See also Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 541 (1985) (suggesting that
preference for and availability of adjudication was receding throughout the 1970s and early
1980s); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in
Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform. 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659. 701. 716 (1993)
(commenting on the effect of the Pound Conference on summary judgment procedures); Stephen
N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155,
1156-59 (1993) (describing the 1976 Pound Conference as the start of the conservative, pro-
defendant, pro-business counter-revolution and declining access to courts, which was arranged by
Chief Justice Burger).
189. The 1983 Amendment to Rule 11 moved from a subjective to an objective standard for
assessing counsel's compliance with its edict that a lawyer's signature on a pleading, motion, or
other paper constituted a certification that it was adequately supported in fact or law, made
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for the new era. Scott v. Harris and subsequent problematic cases such
as Twiqbal arguably are but imperialistic extensions of this fateful
change of direction.
But whatever the genealogy of this new judge-made civil litigation, it
has proven problematic. It appears to be an inefficient, anti-democratic
exercise in result-oriented judicial activism.190 But it also appears
unstoppable. Although subsequent Supreme Courts may differ from the
Roberts Court in doctrine and ideology, judges may be unwilling to
cede back to juries and litigants the power they formerly enjoyed under
the 1938 rules, even as interpreted by the Rehnquist Court. Once power
is acquired, it is seldom given back easily. Absent a major change in
the Court's membership and attitudes, the wrongs of recent cases are
unlikely to be righted, particularly in regard to summary judgment in
view of the 8-1 Scott v. Harris opinion and the subsequent retirement of
lone dissenter Justice Stevens. 191
A more prudent course of judicial conduct would include greater
reluctance to grant summary judgment, a course of action that not only
avoids the waste of reversed grants of summary judgment, but also
consistently provides for the benefits of the trial process and lay juror
scrutiny of claims. In particular, the controlled process of trial and the
forced deliberation of lay jurors could provide a powerful antidote to
not only overt biases and prejudices but also to the more subtle warping
of perception and rational thought that stems from cognitive illiberalism
and its cousins. This would certainly be an improvement over the
narrowness of the judicial exercise of self-serving bias when viewing
contested evidence.192
sanctions for violation mandatory, and generally set a tone more conducive to the finding of
violation and imposition of sanctions. See SANCTIONS: RULE II & OTHER POWERS 1-8 (Melissa
L. Nelken ed., 3d ed. 1992) ("Many laud Rule II for having accomplished its primary goal of
making lawyers 'stop and think' . . . others question whether the price paid . .. has been too high
in terms of the Rule's chilling effect on novel or unpopular claims."); GEORGENE M. VAIRO,
RULE II SANCTIONS, at xxxi (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004) ("The rule has always had a
salutary purpose: to curb abuses and cut down on waste in the system" but "many have objected
to the rule's . . . potential for stitling the evolution of law."); see also id. at 5-10 (tracing the
history of Rule II). The 1983 Amendment to Rule 16 made pretrial conferences and case
management by judges more important and was perceived as part of an overall trend toward more
"managerial judging" by the bench and more aggressive judicial case management, which has
been criticized for excessively empowering judges' pretrial impressions in derogation of the trial
process and jury deliberation. See, e.g., Resnik. supra note 188, at 530-40 (noting the decline of
the role of the judge from adjudicator to case-manager).
190. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 5, at 406 (noting the democratic aspects of trial and
the degree to which civil litigation doctrine discouraging trial has anti-democratic implications).
191. See supra notes 36-71 (describing the Scott v. Harris decision and lone dissent of Justice
Stevens).
192. See supra notes 122 74 (reviewing the fact-sharpening benefits of trial and the tendency
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Achieving this more prudent course is another matter. One important
feedback loop in the system of Madisonian civil procedure is
amendment of the Civil Rules, both in response to perceived changes in
American litigation and as a corrective for problematic Supreme Court
decisions orjudicial tendencies.
In years past, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules has been
willing to enter the fray to craft corrective amendments. Noticing a line
of cases, primarily in the Third Circuit, that prevented summary
judgment merely because the nonmovant alleged disputed facts (rather
than making a proper showing in the record through affidavits or other
material), the Committee revised Rule 56 to correct the problem.193
When the 1983 Amendment to Rule 11 created unanticipated problems,
the Advisory Committee responded with the 1993 Amendment that
appears largely to have corrected the problem. Included in the 1993
Amendment was a "legislative overruling" of the Court's ruling in
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment,194 which had refused to
impose vicarious liability on a Rule 11-offending law firm and instead
had let the firm associate who signed the pleading take the fall. 195
When the Court issued Schiavone v. Fortune, Inc.,196 which unduly
limited the relation back of amendments changing parties, the
Committee responded with a revised Rule 15.197
of jury deliberation to counteract narrow cognitive perspective through required receipt of
different perspectives on the evidence).
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes (1963) (amended 1987); see also Stempel,
supra note 2, at 132-34 (describing the history of former Rule 56(e)).
194. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Grp.. 493 U.S. 120, 126-27 (1989) (holding that
only attorneys actually signing a pleading are liable if the pleading violates Rule 11 even if others
in the law firm participated).
195. In Pavelic & LeFlore, the Court took a narrow textual construction of Rule II that, under
the 1983 version, spoke only of a single attorney signing pleadings and reasoned that it was more
consistent with the language of the Rule to impose sanctions only on the signer of an offending
pleading, motion, or other paper rather than the attorney's law firm, even if as a practical matter
the law firm was requiring the attorney to sign (perhaps even as a sacrificial lamb for
controversial contentions) and was clearly supporting the attorney's assertion of the claims.
196. Schiavone v. Fortune, Inc., 477 U.S. 21, 30 (1986), superseded by statute, FED. R. Civ. P.
15 (1991 Amendment), as recognized in Keller v. U.S., No. 10-3545, 2011 WL 5008422 (7th Cir.
Oct. 20, 2011) (ruling that the amended complaint changing the name of the defendant did not
relate back to the date of the original complaint even though it appeared that the real target
defendant was, as a practical matter, aware of the claim at the time it was first brought); see also
Harold S. Lewis, Jr.. The Excessive History ofFederal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules
Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1507-09 (1987) (criticizing Schiavone, the amendment, and the
relation-back doctrine).
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's notes (1991) (illustrating that the 1991
changes to Rule 15(c) were designed to facilitate relation back and overrule this aspect of
Schiavone).
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Today's steroidal summary judgment, most embarrassingly reflected
in Scott v. Harris,198 demands Committee response, as does the
metamorphosis of Rule 12(b)(6) motions into stealth summary
judgment motions via Twiqbal. To date, the Committee response-at
least to Twiqbal-is that it is studying the problem, in particular lower
court application of Twiqbal, to determine whether trial courts have
applied Twiqbal so expansively as to warrant Committee
intervention. 199
Cynics might see this as the Committee (like the profession
generally) hoping that trial judges are smart enough to largely ignore
Twiqbal in garden variety cases and use it only sparingly for clearly
disfavored cases such as massive antitrust claims (Twombly) or suits
against the Attorney General regarding controversial public policy
matters (Iqbal).200 The Committee should address Twiqbal on its own
terms as defective jurisprudence clearly in violation of the letter and
intent of Rule 12 as Court error, for which there is no need for empirical
study. The Court in Twiqbal twice exceeded its power by rewriting the
Rules. It should be called to account by the Committee, even to the
point of forcing what may be a losing showdown between the
Committee (and Judicial Conference) and the Court itself, which must
promulgate the Committee's product for the change to become effective
under the Rules Enabling Act.
198. See supra notes 52 71 and accompanying text (describing the problematic imposition of
summary judgment reversed on appeal); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away From
Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders. 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 335. 355-57
(2010) (describing highly suspicious grants of summary judgment by trial courts that were readily
reversed on appeal and contributed to a multi-year saga of a case).
199. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS To DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTEROBAL (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf (noting the impact of the 1qbal decision on trial court
rulings regarding motions to dismiss); Andrea Kuperman, Review of Case Law Applying Bell
Atlantic Corp. v Twombly and Ashcroft v Iqbal, Memorandum to Civil Rules Committee and
Standing Rules Committee (March 29, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal memoMarch_2011 .pdf (describing ongoing work).
200. As a practical matter, this is how some commentators construe Twiqbal. as cases that
changed the rules of the game for disfavored, suspect, or controversial claims, but not necessarily
for run-of-the-mill claims. See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 120, § 3.3.2. Of course, even if this
narrower reading of the practical impact of Twiqbal is correct. individual judges are nonetheless
empowered to impose their personal preferences where the type of dispute prompts them to
impose their personal preferences.
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VIII. BACK TO THE FUTURE: RETURNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO ITS
PRE-TRILOGY ROOTS
Corrective action is justified. But what corrective action? Clearly,
judges are hard to constrain when they think they know the answer to
contested litigation facts. Judges in pursuit of their preferred result are
even willing to engage in over-the-top rhetoric that is almost
embarrassing. 201
Prior to this modern era of steroidal summary judgment, the
established practice essentially refused summary judgment so long as
the nonmovant proffered at least some evidence to support its case.
Summary judgment in the pre-trilogy era was akin to a directed verdict
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Galloway v. United States,202
in which the Court clearly established that a well-made Rule 50 motion
could be defeated only by "substantial" evidence rather than a mere
"scintilla" of evidence. 203
There was a logic and symmetry to this world of litigation. Prior to
trial, a claimant could keep the claim alive even with what many might
see as weak evidence, but then later have the opportunity to develop
facts at trial. But if during or after trial it became clear that the
claimant's evidence was very thin (a scintilla) and insufficiently
substantial, a trial judge, by then steeped in the evidence with a feel for
the case, could grant a directed verdict, or alternatively could submit the
matter to the jury but police seemingly bizarre or unfair results through
a post-trial Rule 50 or Rule 59 motion.204
201. In Scott v. Harris, for example, Justice Scalia described the chase scene as harrowing and
the scariest he had seen since THE FRENCH CONNECTION (Twentieth Century Fox 1971).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (No. 05-1531). available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/05-163 1.pdf. Although
the chase videotape of course raises concerns, it is hardly the type of "rock-em, sock-em, smash-
em-up" footage one sees in most Hollywood chase scenes.
202. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
203. See id. at 374 78 (pointing out that the claimant nonmovant must demonstrate substantial
evidence supporting his or her position to defeat a directed verdict motion). In 1991, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50 was amended to substitute the term 'judgment as a matter of law" for
the term "directed verdict." See FED. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991) (providing
background on use of the motion and rationale for the nomenclature change, in particular noting
that under former nomenclature, judges never directed juries as to the verdict they should reach
but merely entered judgment without submitting the matter to a jury). Prior to the trilogy,
summary judgment was subject to a scintilla rule, although the term was not widely used in
summary judgment opinions. Rather, courts routinely stated that a nonmovant could defeat
summary judgment by setting forth any specific facts creating a dispute of material fact. See, e.g.,
Stempel, supra note 2, at 162-70 (illustrating that a judge could grant summary judgment if a
party produced little or no material evidence to supports its claims).
204. See Stempel. supra note 2. at 170-72 (describing the ability and flexibility of the trial
process for policing problematic jury verdicts without preventing jury consideration altogether, as
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This forgiving standard for nonmovants was not often described as a
scintilla rule, but it was in essence the regime that prevailed. If a
nonmovant proffered evidence to support its position, even evidence the
judge regarded as weak, the judge was required to deny summary
judgment. This attitude was sometimes described-and criticized-as a
"slightest doubt" standard under which courts were to deny summary
judgment if there was even the "slightest doubt" as to the facts. 205 But
this is an unfair characterization. Where there is at least some evidence
favoring the party opposing summary judgment and the motion is
denied as it would have been prior to the trilogy, this is not because the
court has slight doubt but rather because there is an actual dispute of
material fact, a dispute that requires resolution at trial. Further, the
slightest doubt standard would, even as described by its critics, be an
improvement over the trilogy and its ability to produce abominations
like Scott v. Harris.
The downside of a scintilla approach to summary judgment is some
additional amount of trial time or settlement payments for very weak
claims. But the downside of the more aggressive regime of the trilogy-
Twiqbal-Scott v. Harris is judge-driven elimination of claims that might
well succeed before a jury and resulting in injustices as well as Seventh
Amendment violations. (If there are contested questions of fact
existence or fact inference, the Thomas critique of summary judgment is
correct.) Add to this the inefficiency of erroneous grants of summary
judgment reversed on appeal (even under the current regime) and the
additional costs and attrition created by the need for these appeals and
the net case for the trilogy and Scott v. Harris summary judgment is
mixed at best.
To the extent there is empirical doubt about whether too many weak
or meritless claims survived prior to the trilogy or whether too many
good claims were unfairly struck down or made unduly expensive to
prosecute because of the trilogy, erring on the side of caution, a full
airing of the issues at trial, and support for the civil jury seems the wiser
course. A quarter century of psychological and sociological learning
since the trilogy has underscored the error of the Court's 1986 turn
toward a more imperial, oracle-like judiciary.
One virtue of the de facto scintilla rule that dominated pre-1986
summary judgment was that it minimized the trial court's weighing and
it takes place when summary judgment is granted).
205. See id. at 140-54 (noting the existence of the "slightest doubt" standard. or at least its
rhetoric, prior to the 1986 trilogy): see also HAYDOCKET AL.. supra note 180. §12.4.7 (describing
summary judgment and suggesting that the "slightest doubt" standard is excessively cautious).
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assessment of the evidence, which acted as a restraint on the judge's
ability to substitute his or her personal preferences for jury deliberation.
A judge might be skeptical of a claimant's evidence but would
nonetheless, in most cases, need to concede that there was at least
something there, a concession that allowed for greater factual
development.
But when the trilogy moved toward the "substantial evidence"
standard and permitted consideration of the burden of persuasion
(Liberty Lobby) and judicial elevation of scholarly theory above
submitted factual assertions (Matsushita), this greater empowerment of
trial judges made them more likely to look at a claimant/nonmovant's
factual assertions and deem them too weak to defeat summary
judgment. The judge was now deciding fact disputes prior to trial, a
power that grew with accretion from the trilogy to Scott v. Harris.
What was unimaginable prior to the trilogy-eight Justices watching a
video and deciding the case on the basis of the video over a colleague's
dissent and the differing perceptions of four lower court judges-
became reality, because for a quarter-century the bench had gotten used
to weighing and determining facts in a way closed to the bench prior to
the trilogy.
If the summary judgment standard returned to the scintilla rule, either
by express amendment or judicial consensus that more humility and
pluralism were required, trial judges would logically be more reluctant
to grant summary judgment, which in turn would produce more trials
and more jury deliberation, as well as more defensible settlements.
Again, the cognitive learning of the past two decades is helpful to the
analysis. As discussed above, "people make probability judgments on
the basis of an initial value" or an anchor.206 This can lead to error
because people also often "make insufficient adjustments" to the initial
anchoring value, which may have an "arbitrary or irrational source"
leading to a "high level of arbitrariness."207
But anchoring can also be a force for good. Consider the legal
system's use of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal
matters. This anchors the factfinder to a view that a defendant should
be convicted and punished only if the factfinder is very, very sure of
guilt.208 Although it appears that people "slouch" away from this
206. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS. supra note 80. at 5 (describing the anchoring
phenomenon and the potential for an ill-set anchor to distort resulting thought).
207. Id. (providing examples of jury judgments about damage awards that are likely to be
based on an anchor, which can produce a high level of arbitrariness).
208. See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977) (noting that in a survey of trial judges who
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anchor and may convict only when they are pretty sure of guilt, the
strong beyond-a-reasonable-doubt anchor at least minimizes the chances
of conviction when a judge or jury merely finds that most of the
evidence points toward guilt.
In similar fashion, a scintilla rule approach to summary judgment can
anchor judges. By setting a standard opposed to summary judgment if
there is any evidence favoring the nonmovant or any possibility that a
reasonable jury could assess a piece of evidence (such as the Scott v.
Harris video) in a manner favorable to the nonmovant, the judge
becomes less likely to grant summary judgment merely because he or
she is more favorably disposed toward the movant's evidence. Under a
scintilla rule standard, the judge is forced to refrain from terminating the
case so long as there is some dispute. As long as the dispute is genuine
in the sense of not being fabricated or not in defiance of ironclad laws
of nature (e.g., an assertion that a witness was unable to see a morning
shooting because he was blinded by the sun rising in the West),
summary judgment is denied. In some cases, of course, judges will be
unable to resist subconsciously imposing their preferred construction of
the contested facts, but the anchor of the scintilla rule will exert some
significant force against this tendency while the trilogy, instead, at least
fails to constrain this tendency and probably encourages it at the
margin.
By suggesting a return to pre-trilogy summary judgment doctrine,
this Article does not also suggest that movement back to scintilla rule
thinking will magically make perfect justice universal. First, the ability
of rules to shape behavior is powerful but limited. Anchoring exerts a
pull on the psyche but not an absolute hold. Drivers speed in spite of
speed limit signs and occasional speed traps and tickets. Impatience,
oversight, or a driver's view that he or she has a better feel for the
correct maximum speed will often triumph over the posted limits even if
well-backed by the sanctions of law. Similarly, judges, particularly
after twenty-five years of the trilogy and the Supreme Court's own
behavior in Scott v. Harris, will often be unable to restrain themselves
from entering judgment where they think an outcome is certain in spite
of some evidence to the contrary. Although certainly not a cure-all,
moving the bar for decisions from a substantial evidence-as-measured-
were asked to convert the concept of beyond-a-reasonable-doubt to a percentage. responses
largely ranged from 80% to 100%. with some below 80%). Obviously, and troublingly, judges
who peg the reasonable doubt test as only slightly stronger than the preponderance of the
evidence standard have strayed too far from the correct concept of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard by requiring something approaching absolute certainty as a prerequisite to a criminal
conviction.
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by-the-ultimate-burden-of-persuasion-at-trial standard to the scintilla
rule is likely to help.
In addition, there will of course be instances where cases go to trial
and receive jury consideration even though the evidence is very weak.
But these cases have always existed, and exist even today in spite of
steroidal summary judgment. The proper judicial response to an
unreasonable jury verdict will continue to be, as was intended by the
1938 Rules and the historical norms of civil litigation, a grant of a new
trial (e.g., where verdicts are excessive or tainted by improper
procedure) or judgment as a matter of law. For post-verdict Rule 50
motions, the court will apply a substantial evidence standard rather than
the new/old scintilla standard.
While this degree of judicial fact assessment is problematic in the
summary judgment context, it is a necessary evil for controlling
unrepresentative jury verdicts. Although the judge's policing of the
verdict also calls into question cognitive illiberalism concerns, at least
after trial the judge is exercising this supervisory power on the basis of
far more information, a better feel for the case, and the chance to have
the judge's own cultural biases rectified through the judge's viewing of
the evidence and assessment of a group of lay jurors.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although it is a truism that no litigation system achieves perfect
justice or optimal efficiency, the move toward more aggressive use of
summary judgment risks too many sacrifices of justice with little
efficiency gain, or perhaps even net efficiency loss. Restoring pre-
trilogy judicial humility, by rule change if necessary, to permit trial and
jury deliberation in more cases can help to combat the innate cognitive
illiberalism and error that afflicts judges making overly aggressive use
of summary judgment. Although Scott v. Harris is a rare case where
judicial error was "caught on tape," it likely represents the tip of a
growing iceberg that the legal system needs to better navigate.
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